Methods and Techniques for Dynamic Deployability of Software-Defined Security Services by Doriguzzi Corin, Roberto
ALMA MATER STUDIORUM · UNIVERSITA` DI BOLOGNA
Dottorato di Ricerca in Ingegneria Elettronica,
Telecomunicazioni e Tecnologie dell’Informazione
Ciclo XXXII
Settore concorsuale: 09/F2 - TELECOMUNICAZIONI
Settore scientifico disciplinare: ING-INF/03 - TELECOMUNICAZIONI
METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR
DYNAMIC DEPLOYABILITY OF
SOFTWARE-DEFINED SECURITY SERVICES
Presentata da:
Roberto Doriguzzi Corin
Coordinatore dottorato:
Prof. Alessandra Costanzo
Supervisori:
Prof. Franco Callegati
Dr. Domenico Siracusa
Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell’Energia Elettrica e dell’Informazione “Guglielmo Marconi”
Esame finale anno 2020

1Abstract
W ith the recent trend of “network softwarisation”, enabled by emerging tech-nologies such as Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Func-
tion Virtualisation (NFV), system administrators of data centres and enterprise net-
works have started replacing dedicated hardware-based middleboxes with virtualised
network functions running on servers and end hosts. This radical change has facili-
tated the provisioning of advanced and flexible network services, ultimately helping
system administrators and network operators to cope with the rapid changes in
service requirements and networking workloads.
This thesis investigates the challenges of provisioning network security services
in “softwarised” networks, where the security of residential and business users can
be provided by means of sets of software-based network functions running on high
performance servers or on commodity compute devices. The study is approached
from the perspective of the telecom operator, whose goal is to protect the customers
from network threats and, at the same time, maximize the number of provisioned
services, and thereby revenue. Specifically, the overall aim of the research presented
in this thesis is proposing novel techniques for optimising the resource usage of
software-based security services, hence for increasing the chances for the operator
to accommodate more service requests while respecting the desired level of network
security of its customers. In this direction, the contributions of this thesis are the fol-
lowing: (i) a solution for the dynamic provisioning of security services that minimises
the utilisation of computing and network resources, and (ii) novel methods based
on Deep Learning and Linux kernel technologies for reducing the CPU usage of
software-based security network functions, with specific focus on the defence against
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
The experimental results reported in this thesis demonstrate that the proposed
solutions for service provisioning and DDoS defence require fewer computing re-
sources, compared to similar approaches available in the scientific literature or adopted
in production networks.
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91 Introduction
N etwork security implemented by Telecommunication Service Providers (TSPs)has traditionally been based on the deployment of specialised, closed, propri-
etary Hardware Appliances (HAs). Such HAs are inflexible in terms of functionalities
and placement in the network, which means that even slight changes in the secu-
rity requirements generally necessitate manually intensive and time-consuming re-
configuration tasks, the replacement of existing HAs or the deployment of additional
HAs.
The NFV [1] initiative has been proposed as a possible solution to address the
operational challenges and high costs of managing proprietary HAs. The main idea
behind NFV is to transform network functions (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection
systems etc.) based on proprietary HAs, into software components (called Virtual
Network Functions (VNFs)) that can be deployed and executed in virtual machines
on commodity, high-performance servers. By decoupling software from hardware,
this approach allows any network function to be deployed in any server connected
to the network. In this context, Network Service Chaining (NSC) is a technique for
selecting subsets of the network traffic and forcing them to traverse various VNFs in
sequence. For example, a firewall followed by an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS),
then a Network Address Translation (NAT) service and so on. NSC and NFV enable
flexible, dynamic service chain modifications to meet the real time network demands.
A promising area of application for NSC and NFV is in network security, where
chains of Virtual Security Network Functions (VSNFs), i.e., security-specific VNFs
such as a firewall or an IPS, can be dynamically created and configured to inspect,
filter or monitor the network traffic. The flexibility of the NSC and NFV paradigms
brings many benefits, among others: (i) highly customizable security services based
on the needs of the end-users, (ii) fast reaction to new security threats or variations of
known attacks, and (iii) low Operating Expenditure (OpEx) and Capital Expenditure
(CapEx) for the operator.
10
1.1 Strategies for Security Service Provisioning
In an NFV-enabled network, the TSP decides which VSNFs should apply for a given
service, where to place them and how to connect them. Such decisions are not only
based on the requirements of the security service to be provisioned, but they are
also influenced by the computing and memory requirements of each VSNF, and by
the computing, memory and network resources available in the NFV infrastructure.
Moreover, the specific position of a VSNF might be dictated by specific TSP’s secu-
rity best practices and policies. For instance, an authentication/authorisation system
should be placed inside the customer’s premises to avoid transmitting sensitive data
outside the local network and to reduce service latency. Another example is a Deep
Packet Inspection (DPI) system used for payload analysis, which requires powerful
data centre servers to cope with the computational complexity of this type of VSNF.
In this case, the position of the data centre is important, as the TSP might want to
block malware or other malicious data as soon as it enters the network by placing the
DPI close to the border.
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Figure 1: Examples of security service provisioning in a TSP scenario.
Figure 1 depicts a few examples of provisioning strategies, in which chains of
VSNFs are configured across the TSP infrastructure to secure the end-user traffic. For
instance, the chain Firewall-IPS is used to monitor and filter the traffic of the Internet
of Things (IoT) devices. Other application-specific services represented in the figure
include a Parental Control, an Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA)
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system, a Virtual Private Network (VPN) client and a Port Scanner (PS) tool used by
the TSP to detect potential security breaches in the customer’s network.
1.1.1 TSP Edge Network
With the recent trend of IoT, TSPs have started moving part of the computing re-
sources to the edge of their network with the aim of addressing concerns related to
processing the data in remote data centres such as high latencies, bandwidth costs,
security and others. As shown in Figure 1, devices at the TSP network edge (often
called edge nodes) can be grouped in two categories:
• Nodes located at the end-user premises, including the Customer Premise Equip-
ment (CPE), home gateways or any other network device leased by the user
and under the control of the TSP. Despite their limited computing and storage
resources, services such as VPN clients, parental controls, AAA and others can
be provisioned at the customer’s premises to minimize the service latency and to
reduce privacy risks.
• Servers in small data centres close to the end-user but located at the TSP premises.
Compared to a CPE, this class of nodes possesses higher storage and computing
resources, although they can be shared among multiple users.
The challenge of provisioning security services at the edge of the network is con-
trolling the impact of CPU demanding VSNFs on the performance of other services
running on the same edge node. For instance, a signature-based IPS might need a large
amount of memory and CPU cycles for querying large databases, even under normal
traffic conditions. Therefore, by overloading the edge node, the IPS would reduce the
performance of latency-sensitive VSNFs running on the node, hence reducing part of
the benefits obtained with this provisioning approach. On the other hand, given the
increasing number of DDoS attacks involving compromised IoT devices, provisioning
an IPS at the edge might be required for detecting and blocking the DDoS traffic as
soon as it leaves the compromised devices.
1.1.2 TSP Core network
The second option is placing part of the VSNFs in data centres located at the core of the
TSP network. Of course, the main benefit here is the massive computing and memory
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resources that can be devoted to security services. Moreover, data centres close to the
border of the TSP network can be used to mitigate network attacks coming from other
administrative domains, hence before they compromise the rest of the network and
user services. However, the location of the data centres in the network might lead to
longer paths for the traffic, leading to higher latencies and bandwidth consumption.
1.2 Research Challenges
Compared to specialised HAs, VSNFs may have a significant impact on the per-
formance of the network and on the Quality of Service (QoS) level experienced by
the users. The virtualisation overhead, the utilisation level of the servers and the
techniques adopted to implement the VSNFs are the most significant contributors to
the QoS degradation. Meaning that, the strategies for provisioning security services
in softwarised networks must take into account not only the security requirements,
but also the specific QoS needs of user applications. Omitting the latter may lead,
for instance, to a provisioning mechanism that blindly forces all the user traffic to
traverse the whole chain of VSNFs. As a result, computationally demanding VSNFs
such as IPSs may cause a noticeable performance degradation to latency-sensitive
applications (e.g., online games [2]) or bandwidth sensitive applications (e.g., video
streaming). From the TSP perspective, the challenge is to ensure a consistent imple-
mentation of its security policies and best practices, while respecting the specific QoS
requirements of customers’ applications.
The latency introduced to the network traffic by softwarised functions is a major
concern in NFV-enabled networks. Indeed, unlike traditional network functions pro-
vided through dedicated HAs, VSNFs run on general purpose hardware, such as data
centre servers, competing with other VSNFs for computing and memory resources.
A notable example in this regard is the defence against DDoS attacks, which includes
inspection and filtering of large volumes of malicious traffic (also in the order of
Gigabits per second) generated by thousands of compromised devices. In such a
scenario, a VSNF devoted to the DDoS attack detection/mitigation might overload the
CPU and exhaust the memory, resulting in serious delays for all the VSNFs running on
the same server. Recently, technologies such as DPDK [3] and Netmap [4] have been
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proposed to improve the performance, reduce latency, and provide more predictable
overall behaviour of generic VNFs. However, although NFV performance is getting
better, there is still a risk of bottlenecks, and VSNF implementation techniques still
need to be fine-tuned to guarantee maximisation of performance with minimum risk
of latency-sensitive service disruption.
1.3 Contributions and Outline of the Thesis
In this thesis, we tackle the challenges outlined in Section 1.2 related to the provision-
ing of security services in softwarised network environments, where the availability
of computing, memory and storage resources allows the dynamic deployment and
customisation of chains of VSNFs. Specifically, we propose a novel approach, called
PESS (Progressive Embedding of Security Services), to provision security services by
composing chains of VSNFs according to the specific QoS needs of user applications
and the security policies defined by the TSP. TSP’s security policies (given as an input
to PESS) include: the type of VSNFs (e.g., firewall, IPS, etc.) that should be deployed
for a specific class of applications, their order (e.g., firewall first, then IPS, etc.), and
their location in the TSP infrastructure (e.g., a parental control should be installed at
the edge of the TSP network, hence close to the user’s premises).
To assess the performance issues of the VSNFs, we study the challenges of pro-
visioning software-based security network functions in resource-constrained devices,
such as the edge nodes. In this regard, one of the most complex and relevant problems
in today’s networks is the defence against volumetric DDoS attacks. As the malicious
DDoS traffic often looks like normal network traffic, both detection and mitigation
process are usually computationally expensive. Indeed, the detection requires com-
plex algorithms and long training sessions to achieve the desired level of accuracy.
The mitigation involves inspecting large volumes of traffic and comparing the traffic’s
characteristics with the information contained in large databases. Hence, the second
part of this thesis focuses on the specific problem of the defence against DDoS attacks,
by studying novel approaches for attack detection and mitigation that are suitable for
devices with limited computing, memory and storage capabilities, such as the nodes
located at the edge of the TSP network.
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The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we present PESS, a dynamic and application aware approach
to provision security services by means of chains of VSNFs. PESS defines a
mathematical formulation and a heuristic algorithm to tackle the provisioning
problem in dynamic network scenarios, where the service requests are not known
in advance. In contrast, advance knowledge of service requests is assumed by
the majority of related works. PESS is evaluated in terms of quality of the
solutions (deviation from optimality) and scalability performed on real-world
and randomly generated topologies.
• In Chapter 3, we propose a lightweight Deep Learning (DL)-based DDoS detec-
tion architecture suitable for online resource-constrained environments, which
leverages Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to learn the behaviour of
DDoS and benign traffic flows with both low processing overhead and attack
detection time. We call our model LUCID (Lightweight, Usable CNN in DDoS
Detection). LUCID is compared to state-of-the-art solutions and validated on a
resource-constrained hardware platform to demonstrate the applicability of the
approach in edge computing scenarios.
• In Chapter 4, we study technological solutions to mitigate volumetric DDoS
attacks in medium-sized servers, whose computing and memory resources are
comparable to those of servers available in micro data centres at the edge of
the TSP network. We first analyse various approaches that can be used for an
efficient and cost-effective DDoS mitigation. Then, we describe the design and
the implementation of a DDoS mitigation pipeline that leverages the flexibility
and efficiency of eXpress Data Path (XDP) and the performance of the hardware-
based filtering to handle large amounts of traffic and attackers.
• Chapter 5 draws the conclusion of the thesis and highlights open issues and
challenges to be further investigated.
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2 Application-Aware Security Services
in Softwarised Networks
In this chapter, we present PESS (Progressive Embedding of Security Services), asolution to efficiently deploy chains of VSNFs based on the QoS and security
requirements of individual applications and operators’ policies, while optimising
resource utilisation. PESS defines an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation
for the progressive provisioning of security services (the PESS ILP model), where the
objective function requires minimisation of the usage of network and computing re-
sources, and it is subject to routing, resource, QoS and security constraints. Moreover,
PESS implements a heuristic algorithm, called PESS heuristic, to obtain near-optimal
solutions of the provisioning problem in an acceptable time frame (in the order of a
few milliseconds even in large network scenarios). Although the PESS formulation
and implementation presented in this chapter focus on security-specific services, the
proposed approach is also suitable for more complex scenarios, where heterogeneous
network services provided by means of generic VNFs coexist (e.g., security, video
broadcasting, content caching, etc.).
We prove that PESS can deploy more security services over the same infrastructure
compared to an application-agnostic approach (the baseline), while still respecting the
security policies and best practices defined by the TSP. With PESS, each traffic flow
generated by each application can be served by the strict subset of VSNFs that are
necessary to ensure its security, which means that no flow is burdened with any
unnecessary security function that could affect its smooth execution, as would be the
case with an application-agnostic approach. Of course, the capability of the VSNFs to
properly contrast any security attack depends on the specific implementation of the
VSNF itself. This aspect is investigated in Chapters 3 and 4 in the context of DDoS
attack detection and mitigation, respectively.
The study detailed in this chapter has been carried out in collaboration with
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Queen’s University Belfast’s Centre for Secure Information Technologies. Moreover,
the results have been presented at the third IEEE International Workshop on Security
in NFV-SDN [5] and published in the IEEE Transactions on Network and Service
Management [6].
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 gives the rele-
vant background information. Section 2.2 provides the motivation behind this work.
Section 2.3 details the mathematical formulation of the PESS ILP model, while Section
2.4 describes the PESS heuristic algorithm that we implemented to solve the problem.
In Section 2.5, the heuristic algorithm is evaluated on real-world and random topolo-
gies. Section 2.6 reviews and discusses the related work.
2.1 Background
The work presented in this chapter is underpinned by two emerging network tech-
nologies; Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) and SDN and their integration to
provision network security solutions.
2.1.1 Network Function Virtualisation
Today’s network functions such as firewalling, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs), etc. are provided by specialised proprietary hardware ap-
pliances (also called middleboxes) strategically deployed in the network. The NFV
paradigm separates the network functions from the underlying hardware by moving
the functions from specialised devices to off-the-shelf commodity equipment such
as industry standard servers or high-performance network devices. Therefore, net-
work services can be decomposed into multiple VNFs running on physical or virtual
machines, which could be located in data centres, network nodes or at the end-user
premises.
In contrast to middleboxes, the configuration of which requires intensive and time-
consuming manual intervention, NFV allows an automated and flexible deployment
of network functions on any NFV-enabled device. The lifecycle management of VNFs
and hardware resources is achieved through a centralised software component called
the Orchestrator.
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2.1.2 Software-Defined Networking
SDN is often referred to as a paradigm for network environments where the control
plane is physically separated from the data plane and a logically centralised control
plane controls several devices. This differs from traditional networks in which nodes
are autonomous systems unaware of the overall state of the network. In SDN deploy-
ments, the nodes are remotely controlled via standard protocols (e.g., OpenFlow [7])
by a logically centralised intelligent module called the SDN controller, which bases
routing decisions on a global (domain) view of the network.
The controller is a software component which runs on commodity hardware appli-
ances and provides an open Application Programming Interface (API) to program
the network for configuration, monitoring and troubleshooting purposes [8]. Such
programmability enables automated and dynamic network configurability and fine-
grained control of the traffic based on the values of the packets’ header fields (e.g.,
source/destination IP/MAC addresses, VLAN tags, TCP/UDP ports, etc.).
2.1.3 Service Function Chaining
Service Function Chaining (also known as Network Service Chaining) is a technique
for selecting and steering data traffic flows through network services. The network
services can be traffic management applications such as load balancing, or security
applications such as those detailed in Section 2.1.4. Service function chaining com-
bines the capabilities of SDN and NFV to connect a distributed set of VNFs.
2.1.4 A Taxonomy of Security VNFs
As introduced in Section 2.1.1, a VNF is a software implementation of a network
function which is deployed on a virtual resource such as a Virtual Machine. Table 1
provides a list of the most common security functions. Traditionally, the majority of
these functions would have been implemented on dedicated hardware (middleboxes)
to process the network traffic along the data path. Today, these functions are deployed
as VNFs. Table 1 includes a short description of each VNF and some of the publicly
available open-source implementations or commercial products.
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VNF Description Use in security Implementations
Antispam Email filtering Malware detection,
Phishing prevention
SpamAssassin, rspamd,
ASSP, Juniper vSRX
Antivirus Email, Web scanning,
Endpoint security
Virus, Trojan,
Malware detection
ClamAV, ClamWin,
Juniper vSRX
DLP Data Loss,
Leakage Prevention
Data exfiltration detection myDLP, OpenDLP
DPI Payload analysis
Spam Filtering, Intrusion detection,
DDoS detection, Malware detection,
Security Analytics
OpenDPI, nDPI,
L7-filter, Libprotoident,
PACE, NBAR, Cisco ASAv
Honeypot Traffic redirection
and inspection
Spam filtering, Malware detection,
SQL database protection,
Security Analytics
HoneyD, SpamD, Kippo,
Kojoney, Dionaea, Glastopf
IDS Traffic inspection
(header and payload)
Intrusion detection, Malware
detection, DDoS detection,
Security Analytics
Snort, Bro, Suricata, AIDE,
ACARM-ng, OSSEC, Samhain,
Cuckoo, Cisco ASAv
IPS Traffic filtering based on
header and payload
Intrusion prevention,
DDoS prevention
Snort, Suricata, ACARM-ng,
Fail2Ban, Juniper vSRX
NAT1 IP address mapping Intrusion prevention Netfilter, IPFilter, PF
Packet Filter
Firewall
Header-based
packet filtering
Intrusion prevention
Netfilter, nftables, NuFW,
IPFilter, Juniper vSRX,
ipfw, PF, VMWare vShield,
Fortigate FW
Parental
Control
Media content filtering
Blocking access to
inappropriate content
OpenDNS, SquidGuard,
DansGuardian, pfsense
VPN Gateway Site-to-site VPN connection
over unsecured networks
Data Tunneling/Encryption
OpenVPN, strongSwan,
Juniper vSRX, Cisco ASAv,
Fortigate VPN
WAF HTTP traffic monitoring,
filtering, logging
Prevention of SQL injection,
cross-site scripting
ModSecurity
1 NAT is not a security function but inherently provides packet filtering similar to a firewall.
Table 1: Taxonomy of security VSNFs.
2.2 Motivation
We motivate our work by describing two use case scenarios, namely web browsing
and online gaming, where the TSP exploits the NSC and NFV technologies to provide
security services tailored to specific users’ application requirements.
Web browsing. Parental control is applied to Web traffic to block unwanted
media and social-media content, while an IDS might be used to intercept malicious
software (malware). Stateful VSNFs provide security functionality by tracking the
state of network connections (e.g., Layer 4 firewall, NAT). In this case, the same
VSNF instance must be traversed by all traffic flows of a network conversation
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in order to maintain the correct state of the connection. More flexible provisioning
schemes can be adopted for stateless VSNFs, where multiple instances of the same
VSNF might be deployed on different servers for load balancing. This example also
illustrates the security best-practice that unwanted traffic should be blocked as soon
as it enters the network by placing firewalls and IDS/IPS close to the border of the
TSP domain. Another generally accepted practice, is to place firewalls before IDS/IPS
(from the point of view of incoming traffic). Firewalls are generally designed to drop
unauthorised traffic very quickly, thus reducing the burden on IDS/IPS, which are
more computationally expensive.
Online gaming. An IDS might also be used to detect possible threats due to
the misuse of chat tools integrated within the gaming software (e.g., phishing [9],
social engineering [10], etc.). As the communication between the client and the server
relies on timely delivery of packets, IDS operations are not executed on the in-game
traffic. In this case the security is enforced by a faster VSNF such as a Firewall, which
checks the packet headers without any deep-payload analysis. It should be noted that
web traffic and chat conversations are often encrypted by TLS/SSL cryptographic
protocols. Although encryption preserves the confidentiality of the traffic, it also
prevents IDS-based VSNFs such as Parental Control and IDS from inspecting the
packets, thus allowing an attacker to obfuscate malicious data in encrypted payloads.
However, the TSP could overcome this limitation either using a Transparent Proxy
VSNF or by exploiting recent advances in network security [11], [12].
These are just two examples of how the security service can be tailored to the
user’s application requirements by appropriate selection and placement of VSNFs. A
list of common classes of applications supported in the TSP use-case is provided in
Table 2 with their corresponding security and QoS requirements and relevant VSNFs.
One of them, the remotely accessible CCTV system, will be used in the rest of this
chapter as a running example to illustrate various aspects of our work.
According to the motivations provided above, we can summarize the rationale
behind the PESS approach as follows: (i) a user’s application should never under-
perform because of VSNF operations and (ii) the VSNF placement must obey the
TSP’s security best-practices in terms of application security requirements, position
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Application class Description Related threats Relevant VSNF 1 QoS requirements
CCTV systems
Closed Circuit TV
for video surveillance
accessible remotely
Port scanning, DDoS
password cracking
Firewall, DPI,
IDS, IPS
Bandwidth: 10Mbps
(5 cameras, 720p, 15fps,
H.264, medium quality)
Latency: 200ms (PTZ2
two-way latency [13])
Email Electronic mail
Malware, spam,
phishing,
data exfiltration
DPI, Antispam,
IDS, DLP
–
Instant messaging
Real-time text-based
Internet chat
Malware, DDoS,
phishing (out-of-band)
DPI, Antispam,
IDS, IPS
–
Media streaming
Audio/video content
accessed over
the Internet
Inappropriate content Parental control
Bandwidth3: 5Mbps (HD)
25Mbps (UHD)
Remote storage
File transfer over
the network
Data exfiltration
VPN, Data
Encryption
Bandwidth
Network services
(DNS, VoD, file
sharing, WWW)
Server application
accessed by remote
client applications
DDoS, SQL injection,
remote code execution
Firewall, IDS,
WAF, Honeypot
–
Online gaming
Video games played
over the Internet
Online game cheating
(out-of-band attacks)
DDoS (in-band attacks)
DPI, Antispam,
IDS, IPS
Latency: 100ms
(first-person games [14])
Peer-to-peer
File sharing over
peer-to-peer networks
DDoS, malware DPI, IDS, IPS –
Video conferencing
Real-time audio/video
over the Internet
DDoS Firewall, IPS Latency: 150ms [15]
Web browsing
Applications for
browsing the WWW
Cross-site scripting,
phishing, malware,
inappropriate content
DPI, WAF,
Parental control
Latency: 400ms [15]
1Acronyms of VSNFs: Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion Prevention System (IPS),
Data Loss/Leakage Prevention (DLP), Virtual Private Network (VPN), Web Application Firewall (WAF).
2PTZ: Pan, Tilt, Zoom.
3Netflix Internet connection speed recommendations.
Table 2: Security and QoS requirements of applications.
in the network, operational mode (stateless or stateful VSNF), and order with respect
to the direction of the traffic. In the next section, we present the PESS mathematical
model for the placement of VSNF chains based on these criteria.
2.3 The PESS Optimal Placement Model
The PESS model (Figure 2) is a mathematical model to progressively embed service
requests, formed by one or multiple VSNF chains, onto a physical network substrate
by considering the available resources and realistic constraints.
PESS takes as input a model of the physical network including the current status
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PESS
Current Resources
Security service 
request
TSP Security policies
Position of VSNFs
Physical path for 
each chain
Updated resourcesConstraints
Figure 2: PESS placement model workflow.
of computing and network resources of servers and links, a security service request
and the TSP’s security policies (expressed in the form of constraints for PESS). The
output of PESS is the mapping of the VSNFs onto the physical network (position
of the VSNFs and one or more paths between them) and an updated model of the
physical network taking into account the resources used to provision the service. The
updated model is used as input for the next request.
Next, we detail definitions, notations, variables, objective function and constraints
that are used in the ILP formulation of the PESS optimal placement model. Notations
and variables are also summarised in Table 3.
Physical network model. We represent the physical network as a weighted graph
G = (N,E), i.e. a graph where weights are assigned to nodes and edges.
Without loss of generality and to simplify the model, we assume that every
node i ∈ N is a NFVI-POP (Network Function Virtualisation Infrastructure Point of
Presence) [16] consisting of a set of servers and a local network composed of routers
and switches. Each node i is characterised by the total computing resources of the
servers γi ∈ N+ expressed in CPU cycles/sec.
A link (k, l) ∈ E is a wired connection between two nodes k and l ∈ N . It is
characterised by its capacity βk,l ∈ N+ and its propagation delay λk,l ∈ N+. Both are
expressed as positive integer numbers representing bandwidth (bits/sec) and latency
(sec).
Regions in a physical network are defined as subsets of nodes sharing some high-
level features. Examples of regions are: (i) a set of nodes in the TSP network providing
the same cloud service (e.g., multimedia caching, data storage, etc.), (ii) the set of
egress nodes that connect the TSP network to the Internet (called border region in the
rest of this chapter), or (iii) the set of nodes at the edge of the TSP network close to a
given user.
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Table 3: Glossary of symbols.
Sets
N Set of physical nodes
E Set of physical links
C Set of all unidirectional chains already embedded in the network
Cs Set of all unidirectional chains in the service request Gs
U c Set of virtual nodes in the chain c
U cpairs Set of unidirectional arcs in the chain c
Ac Set of endpoints of the chain c. Ac ⊂ U c
V c Set of VSNFs in the chain c. V c ⊂ U c
Ru Region of N where VSNF u must be placed (region constraint)
M Region of N where no VSNFs can be placed (veto constraint)
ep1, EP2 Physical endpoints of a service request. ep1 ∈ N,EP2 ⊂ N
Parameters
γi Nominal computing resources of node i (CPU cycles/sec)
γ′i Residual computing resources of node i (CPU cycles/sec)
γu CPU cycles required by u to process one bit of a network packet (CPU cycles/bit)
γcu Computing resources required by node u of chain c (CPU cycles/sec). γcu = γu · βc
βk,l Nominal capacity of link (k, l) (bits/sec)
β′k,l Residual capacity of link (k, l) (bits/sec)
βc Minimum bandwidth required by chain c (bits/sec)
λk,l Propagation delay: the time spent by a packet to traverse the link (k, l) (secs)
λck,l,i,j
Queuing delay: time spent by a packet of chain c to traverse the network devices
(routers and switches) in the local networks of adjacent nodes k and l (secs).
λck,l,i,j > 0 iff k = i or l = j.
λci,u
Processing delay: the time spent by a packet to traverse VSNF u of chain c placed
on node i (secs)
λc Maximum latency tolerated by chain c (secs)
pic
Estimated latency between the TSP network and the remote endpoint of chain c
(secs). pic = 0 if the endpoint belongs to the TSP network.
σc Average packet size of chain c (bits).
bk,l Cost for allocating a unit of bandwidth on link (k,l)
ci Cost for allocating a unit of CPU on node i
Decision variables
xci,u Binary variable such that x
c
i,u = 1 iff node u ∈ U c is mapped to i ∈ N
yck,l,i,j,u,v
Binary variable such that yck,l,i,j,u,v = 1 iff physical link (k, l) ∈ E belongs to the
path between nodes i and j to which u, v ∈ U c are mapped
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Security service request. We model a security service request as a set of indepen-
dent weighted directed graphs:
Gs = {(U c, U cpairs) : c ∈ Cs}
where Cs is the set of unidirectional chains composing the service request. Each graph
includes nodes and arcs. Nodes U c = Ac ∪ V c comprise user and remote applications
(Ac, the endpoints of chain c) as well as a subset of all VSNFs (V c). Each arc in U cpairs
delineates the order of traversing the VSNFs ∈ V c between endpoints in Ac.
Each chain c ∈ Cs is characterised by its requirements in terms of minimum
bandwidth βc and maximum latency λc. Each endpoint in Ac is characterised by an
identifier, which specifies where the endpoint must be placed in the physical network.
The user application is characterised by the identifier of the physical node to which
the user is attached (called ep1 in the rest of the chapter). A remote application is
characterised by the identifier of a region in the physical network (called EP2). For
instance, the border region if the endpoint represents a remote gaming server located
outside the physical network. In this work, ep1 and EP2 are referred to as physical
endpoints of the service request Gs.
A VSNF u ∈ V c is characterised by its requirements in terms of CPU units γu expressed
in CPU cycles/bit. u is also characterised by the latency λci,u it introduces in the
dataplane to process a packet of chain c on node i. As formalised in Equation (13),
this latency is a function of the residual computing capacity of the node i where u
is placed, the computing requirements γu of the VSNF, the average packet size σc of
chain c and the traffic load of the chain (whose upper bound is βc). Finally, a VSNF is
characterised by its operational mode (either stateless or stateful) and by the identifier
of a region in the physical network where it must be placed, if required by the TSP
security policies.
Illustrative example. An example of a security service request for a CCTV system
(see Table 2) is represented in Figure 3. The request in the example is composed of
three chains (c1, c2, and c3), each one identified by the type of traffic and its direction.
Chain c1 is applied to the live video stream captured by the cameras and accessible
over the Internet. The chain comprises a L3 firewall to ensure that the stream is
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CCTV
FW
(γ2)
IPS
(γ1)
Remote
Access
βc1, λc1 βc1, λc1
βc2, λc2 βc2, λc2
βc2, λc2
βc3, λc3
βc3, λc3βc3, λc3 Video Stream
Camera Mgmt/Controls
Figure 3: Example of security service request for the CCTV system.
only transmitted to authorised endpoints. As specified in Table 2, the most relevant
requirement in this case is the bandwidth (βc1) which depends on the frame rate,
frame size and video codec of the CCTV system. In this case, a deep inspection of the
video stream packets (e.g., with an IPS) would not provide any additional protection
but would possibly reduce the frame rate of the video streaming, thus compromising
the detection of anomalous events. On the other hand, the bi-directional control/-
management traffic is inspected by the IPS and the firewall included in chains c2 and
c3. Such VSNFs protect the CCTV system from attacks such as Mirai [17] perpetrated
through bots maliciously installed on Internet-connected devices, while the latency
requirements λc2 and λc3 guarantee the responsiveness of the remote control of the
CCTV cameras (pan, tilt, zoom, etc.).
2.3.1 ILP Formulation
Definitions. Let us first define two binary variables:
• xci,u = 1 iff node u ∈ U c is mapped to i ∈ N .
• yck,l,i,j,u,v = 1 iff physical link (k, l) ∈ E belongs to the path between nodes i and j
to which u, v ∈ U c are mapped.
The residual capacity of a link, β′k,l, is defined as the total amount of bandwidth
available on link (k, l) ∈ E:
β′k,l = βk,l −
∑
c∈C, i,j∈N
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
βc · yck,l,i,j,u,v (1)
thus, it is the nominal capacity of link (k, l) minus the bandwidth required by the
chains c ∈ C already mapped on that link.
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Similarly, the residual capacity of a node is defined as its nominal CPU capacity
minus the computing resources used by the VSNFs v instantiated on the node:
γ′i = γi −
∑
c∈C,u∈V c
γcu · xci,u (2)
Problem formulation. Given a physical network G, for each security service re-
quest Gs, find a suitable mapping of all its unidirectional chains on the physical
network, which minimizes the physical resources of G expended to map Gs, also
known as the embedding cost.
Hence, the solution of the problem is represented by a set of xci,u and yck,l,i,j,u,v such
that the cumulative usage of physical resources for all the chains in Gs is minimised:
min
∑
c∈Cs, i,j∈N,
(k,l)∈E,(u,v)∈Ucpairs
bk,l · βc · yck,l,i,j,u,v + α
∑
c∈Cs,i∈N,u∈V c
ci · γcu · xci,u (3)
Here, α is a factor that can be used to tune the relative weight of the cost compo-
nents (we have used α = 1 for the experiments described in Section 2.5).
bk,l and ci are the costs for allocating bandwidth and CPU:
bk,l =
1
β′k,l + δ
ci =
1
γ′i + δ
They penalize nodes and links with less residual capacity with the aim to increase
the chances of accommodating more security service requests on the given physical
network. δ −→ 0 is a small positive constant used to avoid dividing by zero in
computing the value of the function.
2.3.2 Constraints
Routing Constraint (4) ensures that each node u ∈ U c is mapped to exactly one
physical node i ∈ N . With Constraint (5), a physical link (k, l) can belong to a path
between two nodes i and j for an arc (u, v) ∈ U cpairs of chain c ∈ Cs only if u and v
are mapped to these nodes. Constraint (6) ensures that the path created for arc (u, v)
starts at exactly one edge extending from node i to where VSNF (or start/endpoint)
u is mapped. Similarly, (7) ensures the correctness and the uniqueness of the final
edges in the path. Constraints (5-7) can be easily linearised with standard techniques
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such as the ones presented in [18]. Constraint (8) is the classical flow conservation
constraint. That is, an outbound flow equals an inbound flow for each intermediate
node l (intermediate nodes cannot consume the flow). Together with Constraint
(8), Constraint (9) prevents multiple incoming/outgoing links carrying traffic for a
specific flow in the intermediate node l, i.e., we only consider unsplittable flows.
∑
i∈N
xci,u = 1 ∀c ∈ Cs, ∀u ∈ U c (4)
yck,l,i,j,u,v ≤ xci,u · xcj,v ∀c ∈ Cs,∀i, j ∈ N,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs,∀(k, l) ∈ E (5)∑
(i,k)∈E
j∈N
yci,k,i,j,u,v · xci,u · xcj,v = 1 ∀c ∈ Cs,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs (6)
∑
(k,j)∈E
i∈N
yck,j,i,j,u,v · xci,u · xcj,v = 1 ∀c ∈ Cs,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs (7)
∑
k∈N
(k,l)∈E
yck,l,i,j,u,v =
∑
m∈N
(l,m)∈E
ycl,m,i,j,u,v ∀c ∈ Cs,∀i, j ∈ N,∀l ∈ N, l 6= i, l 6= j,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs (8)
∑
k∈N
(k,l)∈E
yck,l,i,j,u,v ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ Cs,∀i, j ∈ N,∀l ∈ N, l 6= i, l 6= j,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs (9)
Resource Constraints (10-11) ensure that the resources consumed by a security
service do not exceed the available bandwidth and computing capacities.∑
c∈Cs, i,j∈N
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
yck,l,i,j,u,v · βc ≤ β′k,l ∀(k, l) ∈ E (10)
∑
c∈Cs,u∈V c
xci,u · γcu ≤ γ′i ∀i ∈ N (11)
QoS Constraint (12) verifies that the requirements in terms of maximum end-
to-end latency are met. It takes into consideration the propagation delay of physical
links, the processing delay of VSNFs and the queuing delay through network devices.
Note that the minimum bandwidth requirement is verified against the bandwidth
resource Constraint (10).
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pic +
∑
i∈N,u∈V c
xci,u · λci,u +
∑
i,j∈N,(k,l)∈E
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
yck,l,i,j,u,v · (λk,l + λck,l,i,j) ≤ λc ∀c ∈ Cs (12)
pic is an estimation of the propagation delay between the TSP network and the
remote endpoint of chain c, in case the endpoint is outside the TSP network. We
assume that this value is independent from the TSP’s network egress node. Clearly pic
is 0 for those chains whose remote endpoint is part of the TSP network (e.g., a cloud
data centre managed by the TSP).
The processing delay λci,u is the time spent by a packet to traverse VSNF u on
physical node i. It contributes to the overall end-to-end delay of chain c only if VSNF
u is placed on node i (i.e., xci,u = 1). λci,u includes the time taken by the VSNF to process
the packet and the overhead of the virtualisation technology (VMware, KVM, QEMU
virtual machines, Docker containers, etc.). For simplicity, we do not model the delays
due to the CPU scheduler operations implemented on the physical node [19]. Based
on the observations in [20], [21], [22], λci,u is modeled as a convex function of the traffic
load of the chain, and its value is computed by considering the impact of other VSNFs
co-located on the same physical node.
λci,u =
γu · σc
(γ′i − γu · βc) + δ
=
γu · σc
(γ′i − γcu) + δ
(13)
In Equation (13), γu · σc is the average amount of CPU cycles used by VSNF u to
process a packet of chain c (virtualisation overhead included). The latency overhead
caused by co-located VSNFs depends on the amount of computing resources of the
node they use or, equivalently, on the residual computing resources of the node γ′i.
γu · βc = γcu is the amount of CPU cycles/sec used by VSNF u on node i, which
depends on the traffic load of the chain. δ is a small positive constant used to avoid
dividing by zero in the case that u consumes all the residual computing resources of
node i.
The sum λk,l + λck,l,i,j in Equation (12) is the total time spent by a packet travelling
between two adjacent nodes k and l. It includes the propagation delay λk,l, propor-
tional to the distance between k and l, and the queuing delay λck,l,i,j , proportional to
the number of network devices (switches and routers) the packet traverses within
the local networks of k and l. The queuing delay is influenced by the buffer size of
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network devices’ ports and by the traffic load [23]. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that the buffers are correctly dimensioned, i.e. no dropped packets due to
buffer overflow. In addition, we estimate the queuing delay λck,l,i,j as a traffic-load
independent value; a function of the maximum queue capacity of the ports and of the
VSNFs placement (hence a function of indices k, l, i and j). Specifically, λck,l,i,j > 0 if at
least one VSNF is mapped either on k (k = i), or on l (l = j), meaning that a packet of
chain c must traverse the local network of either k, or l (or both) to reach the VSNFs
running on the nodes’ servers. Otherwise, the local networks of k and l are by-passed
by the traffic of c, resulting in λck,l,i,j = 0.
Constraint (14) ensures that the current security service Gs does not compromise
the end-to-end latency of chains cˆ ∈ C in operational security services (also called
operational chains in the rest of the chapter).
picˆ +
∑
i∈N,uˆ∈V cˆ
x¯cˆi,uˆ · λcˆi,uˆ +
∑
i,j∈N,(k,l)∈E
(uˆ,vˆ)∈U cˆpairs
y¯cˆk,l,i,j,uˆ,vˆ · (λk,l + λcˆk,l,i,j) ≤ λcˆ ∀cˆ ∈ C (14)
In Equation (14), x¯cˆ and y¯cˆ are the values of decision variables x and y computed
for the placement of chain cˆ. λcˆi,uˆ is the updated value of the processing delay intro-
duced to the traffic of chain cˆ by VSNF uˆ when running on node i.
λcˆi,uˆ =
γuˆ · σcˆ
(γ′i −
∑
c∈Cs,u∈V c
xci,u · γcu) + δ
(15)
In Equation (15), the value of λcˆi,uˆ is updated by considering the computing re-
sources consumed on node i by VSNFs of the security service request Gs. Approxi-
mation of Equation (15) can be achieved by using piecewise linearisation techniques
and Special-Ordered Set (SOS) variables and constraints available in most commercial
solvers (e.g., [24]).
Security constraints ensure that the TSP’s security policies are applied. Specifi-
cally, Constraint (16) forces a subset C ′s of the chains in the request to share the same
VSNF instance in case of stateful flow processing.
xc1u,i = x
c2
u,i ∀c1, c2 ∈ C ′s ⊂ Cs, i ∈ N, u ∈ V c (16)
Constraint (17) forces the algorithm to place the VSNF u ∈ V c in a specific region
of the network defined as a subset of nodes Ru ⊂ N .
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i∈Ru
xci,u = 1 Ru ⊂ N,Ru 6= ∅, u ∈ V c (17)
We use Constraint (17) to enforce the security close to the user by placing VSNFs on
ep1 (Ru = {ep1}), or to protect a portion of the TSP’s network, such as the border
region or a distributed data centre (Ru = EP2) from potentially malicious user traffic.
Furthermore, Constraint (17) can be used to place a VSNF on a physical node with
special hardware characteristics (e.g., hardware acceleration for encryption). Similarly,
the veto Constraint (18) can be used to prevent the placement of any VSNFs on a pre-
defined subset of nodes M ⊂ N . A TSP may choose to do this to protect specific nodes
(called veto nodes) that host sensitive data or critical functions from user traffic.
∑
i∈M,u∈V c
xci,u = 0 ∀c ∈ Cs,M ⊂ N,M 6= ∅ (18)
Finally, for each chain c ∈ Cs, the correct order of VSNFs in V c is ensured by
Constraints (4-9), plus Constraint (17) applied to user and remote applications u ∈ Ac
with Ru = {ep1} and Ru = EP2 respectively. Note that, the order can be specified
per application (chain), as different applications may require the same VSNFs but in
different order.
These four security constraints enable fulfillment of the security policies/practices
defined by the TSP e.g., the order in which the VSNFs are executed, the position of
the VSNFs in the network, and the operational mode of VSNFs (either stateful or
stateless).
2.4 The PESS Heuristic Algorithm
The embedding problem presented in Section 2.3 has been solved using a commercial
solver. However, given the complexity of the ILP model, the solver is unable to
produce solutions in an acceptable time frame, as required for dynamic scenarios
such as those under study. For this reason, we have also implemented a heuristic
algorithm to find near optimal solutions in much shorter time.
The logic behind the PESS heuristic is based on assuring that Constraints (4-18)
are applied in an efficient manner. In particular, the security constraint (16) ensures
that a stateful VSNF specified in two or more chains in the same service request Gs
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is placed on the same node. However, as different chains might share more than one
stateful VSNF (possibly in a different order), the correct placement of a multi-chain
security service request may become a computationally expensive operation. For this
reason, given a path between ep1 and one of the nodes ep2 ∈ EP2, the heuristic
places all the VSNFs specified in Gs on a maximum of three nodes of the path with
the following strategy: (i) place each region-specific VSNF u ∈ V c (Ru 6= ∅) either on
ep1 or on ep2 ∈ EP2 depending on Ru (i.e., either Ru = {ep1} or Ru = EP2), (ii) place
all the other VSNFs in Gs on the node with the highest residual capacity in the path
to minimize the embedding cost (Equation 3).
The solution is obtained by selecting the candidate path between ep1 and EP2 where
the embedding of all the chains in Gs fulfills the constraints described in Section 2.3
at the lowest cost, as computed with the objective function (Equation 3).
Figure 4: The main steps of the PESS heuristic. Elements in bold form a candidate solution. Blue circles
represent the nodes with the highest computational capacity in the solution. The green circle is a node
bound to the region constraint, while orange circles form the set of nodes excluded from the initial
solution with higher residual capacity than the best node in the initial solution. Node F is a veto node,
while H is a region node.
We first introduce the PESS heuristic with the simplified scenario illustrated in
Figure 4. In the figure, the physical network is represented by nodes A − H , each
annotated with the value of its computational capacity (the number inside each node),
and by a set of edges with their residual bandwidth capacity. A and H are the two
endpoints ep1 = A and EP2 = {H}, while F is a veto node where no VSNFs can
be placed (Constraint 18). In the example, H also defines a region where part of the
VSNFs in the request must be placed. Starting from Figure 4(a), PESS embeds the
service on the shortest path between the two endpoints. This is the initial solution.
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Algorithm 1 the PESS algorithm.
Input: Physical network substrate (G), security service request (Gs), set of active chains in the network
(C)
Output: The mapping of the security service onto the physical substrate (solution). None if no feasible
mappings are found.
1: procedure PESS(G, Gs, C)
2: β¯ ←∑{c∈Cs} βc . total required bandwidth
3: γ¯ ←∑{c∈Cs,u∈V c} γcu . total required CPU
4: P = {p[ep1,ep] | ep ∈ EP2} ← DIJKSTRA(ep1, EP2, β¯)
5: if P = ∅ then
6: return None
7: end if
8: S = {s[ep1,ep] | ep ∈ EP2} ← EMBED(P, β¯, γ¯)
9: NS ← {i ∈ s | s ∈ S} . physical nodes in the initial solutions
10: E ← {i ∈ N | i /∈ NS ∪M, γ′i > γ′j ∀j ∈ NS}
11: s¯[ep1,ep2] ← argmin
s∈S
cost(s) . best initial solution
12: P1 ← DIJKSTRA(ep1, E, β¯)
13: P2 ← DIJKSTRA(ep2, E, β¯)
14: S ← S ∪ EMBED(P1 ∪ P2, β¯, γ¯) . expanded solution set
15: solution←None
16: S ← SORTEDDECREASINGCOST(S)
17: for all cs ∈ S do
18: if LATENCYOPCHAINS(G, C, cs) is True then
19: solution← cs
20: break
21: end if
22: end for
23: if solution is None then
24: return None
25: end if
26: UPDATERESOURCES(solution,G)
27: STORESOLUTION(G, C, solution)
28: return solution
29: end procedure
In Figure 4(b), it computes the shortest path trees from ep1 and from EP2 towards
the nodes not included in the initial solution but with higher residual capacity than
the ones in the initial solution. The resulting trees are then used to build new paths
between ep1 and EP2 (Figure 4(c)). The accepted solution is the path with the lowest
cost that satisfies all the Constraints (4-18).
Initial solution. The embedding process starts at line 4 in Algorithm 1 with
a greedy approach based on the Dijkstra’s algorithm. At this stage, we compute
the shortest path tree between the two endpoints ep1 and EP2 using the residual
bandwidth as link weight computed as bk,l · βc in Equation (3) (Figure 4(a)). The
Dijkstra algorithm stops when all the nodes ep2 ∈ EP2 are marked as visited, i.e.
before building the whole tree of paths. For each path between ep1 and EP2, the
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algorithm places the VSNFs in the chains according to the aforementioned strategy,
the order of the VSNFs as specified in the service request, the latency Constraint (12),
and the security Constraints (16-18) (line 8). The output of this first step is a set of
candidate solutions S with different embedding costs. S is passed as input to the next
step.
Expanded solution set. The algorithm now evaluates whether high-capacity nodes
not included in the initial solution set S can be used to build new solutions with lower
embedding cost. Hence, given the initial set of solutions S, the algorithm identifies the
physical nodes in the network with these two properties (set E defined at line 10 or
nodes colored in orange in Figure 4(b)): (i) not included in the initial set of solutions S
nor veto nodes, and (ii) higher computing capacity with respect to the nodes included
in S. The algorithm then computes the shortest path tree twice, once from ep1 to E
and once from ep2 ∈ EP2 to E (lines 12-13 and Figure 4(b)), where {ep1, ep2} are the
physical endpoints of the solution in S with the lowest embedding cost (line 11).
The resulting subpaths are joined to form a new set of paths between ep1 and ep2.
Afterwards, the algorithm performs the placement of the VSNFs on each of the new
paths with the strategy described earlier in this section. The feasible solutions are
added to the initial set S (line 14 and Figure 4(c)).
The set of candidate solutions is sorted in descending value of embedding cost
(line 16). The first one that satisfies Constraint (14) is the accepted solution (lines 18-
19). Finally, the algorithm updates the values of γ′i and β′i by removing the resources
consumed with the accepted solution and stores the mapping of its chains in the set
C that records all the active chains in the network (lines 26-27).
Latency of operational chains. Given a candidate solution cs ∈ S, function
LATENCYOPCHAINS is invoked to verify whether embedding cs compromises the
end-to-end latency of operational chains (line 18 in Algorithm 1). Instead of verifying
the inequality in Equation (14) for each operational chain, LATENCYOPCHAINS im-
plements a heuristic approach, which reduces the time complexity of this operation
from O(n), with n the number of operational chains, to O(1).
Each time a chain c ∈ C becomes operational, the algorithm computes 〈γ〉c, a
threshold value obtained from Equations (12) and (13) as follows:
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〈γ〉c =
∑
i∈N,u∈V c
x¯ci,u · γu · σc
λc − pic −∑
i,j∈N,(k,l)∈E
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
y¯ck,l,i,j,u,v · (λk,l + λck,l,i,j)
− δ (19)
In Equation (19), x¯ and y¯ are the values of decision variables x and y used to
embed c. 〈γ〉c estimates the minimum average residual computing capacity necessary
to satisfy the inequality in Equation (12). Therefore, the algorithm records and mon-
itors those operational chains with the highest values of 〈γ〉c to establish whether a
candidate solution is feasible or not, as inequality in Equation (12) is violated earlier
for such chains than for the others.
The algorithm stores one operational chain per physical node in a data structure,
i.e. the chain with the highest value of 〈γ〉c with at least one VSNF mapped on that
node. Hence, given the physical nodes mapped in the candidate solution cs, the
algorithm computes Equation (14) only for the operational chains in the data structure
linked to such nodes by using the values of variables x and y of solution cs. If the
inequality is not satisfied for one of those chains, cs is rejected.
As the maximum number of physical nodes used to provision a security service
is three (ep1 and EP2 to fulfill the region constraint and the node with the highest
residual capacity in the path), the worst-case time complexity of this process is O(1),
thus constant in the number of operational chains and with respect to the size of
the network. Therefore, the overall time complexity of the PESS heuristic is O(|E| +
|N | log(|N |)), i.e., the worst-case time complexity of the Dijkstra’s algorithm.
2.5 Evaluation
We first assess the PESS heuristic by comparing its solutions against the optimal em-
beddings as computed by a commercial solver (Gurobi [25]). We then prove the bene-
fits of the proposed application-aware approach against the baseline (the application-
agnostic approach adopted, for instance, in [26]), in which security services are pro-
vided without taking into account the specific requirements of applications. We finally
analyze the scalability of PESS by measuring the average embedding time on different
network sizes.
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2.5.1 Test Configuration
The PESS heuristic has been implemented as a single-threaded Python program, while
the ILP model formalised in Section 2.3 has been implemented with the Gurobi
Python API version 7.5 [27]. All experiments are performed on a server-class com-
puter equipped with 2 Intel Xeon Silver 4110 CPUs (16 cores each running at 2.1 GHz)
and 64 GB of RAM.
2.5.2 Topology
The simulations are performed on synthetic topologies randomly generated based on
the Baraba´si-Albert model [28]. We generate topologies of different sizes and densities
to evaluate the performance of the PESS heuristic in a variety of generic network
scenarios.
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We also validate PESS with two realistic network models. One is the Stanford
University backbone [29] (represented in Figure 5), a medium-scale campus network
consisting of 46 links, 14 operational zone routers, 10 Ethernet switches, and 2 border
routers connecting the University to the Internet. We assume one NFVI-POP for each
network device and 10 Gbps links. The second model is the Italian education and
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research network (consortium GARR [30]). The GARR network, represented in Figure
6, covers the entire Italian national territory ([31]), comprising 83 links and 46 nodes.
Along with the actual view of the physical topology, [31] provides the specification
of the egress nodes, i.e. the nodes that connect the GARR network to the Internet and
that compose the border region in our evaluation (nodes FI1, MI2, PD2, RM2 and TO1,
as indicated in [31]). As we have no information related to data centre distribution in
the GARR network, we have assumed one NFVI-POP for each node. In addition, we
set the nominal capacity of the links βk,l using the values specified in [32].
Given the relatively small size of the Stanford network, we assume no propagation
delay between its nodes, i.e. λk,l = 0 ∀k, l. For the other networks, random and GARR,
we compute the propagation delay of each link with the following formula:
λk,l =
dk,l · r index
C
where r index = 1.5 is an approximation of the refractive index of optical fibers,
C ' 3 ·108 m/s is the speed of light in the vacuum and dk,l is the distance between two
nodes k and l. In the case of random networks, dk,l is a random positive value ranging
from 10 to 100 Km, while for the GARR network dk,l is computed by approximating
the coordinates of the nodes based on the information available on the web site.
As introduced in Section 2.3.2, we estimate the worst-case queuing delay λck,l,i,j as
a traffic-load independent value using the queue capacity of switch ports reported in
[23] (80µs for 10 Gbps ports with a 100 KB buffer). Specifically, we assume a three-tier
local network at each node of GARR and random topologies, resulting in a maximum
of 12 × 80µs queuing delay introduced at each node. This reflects the maximum
queuing delay experienced by each packet crossing a node to be processed by one or
more VSNFs mapped on the node, which involves traversing three network devices
(hence, six 10 Gbps ports) to reach the servers where the VSNFs are running, and
traversing three network devices before leaving the node (six further 10 Gbps ports).
For the campus scenario, implemented using the Stanford University topology, we
instead assume only one network device per node; the device specified in the network
topology. Hence, the maximum queuing latency for a packet crossing a Stanford node
is 4× 80µs.
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For each node of the three evaluation scenarios we assume one server with com-
puting capacity of 32x2.1 GHz (a 32-core CPU running at 2.1 GHz).
2.5.3 Security Service Requests
As introduced in Section 2.3, a security service request is configured by the TSP
to provision security for user applications (see the CCTV example in Section 2.3).
For evaluation purposes, we automatically generate requests composed of a random
number of chains, ranging between 1 and 5. Each chain comprises a random subset of
VSNFs from the list presented in Table 4, with a maximum of 3 VSNFs per chain (i.e.,
up to 15 VSNFs per user application). Based on the use case scenarios illustrated in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 (web browsing, online gaming, CCTV system), we believe these
are reasonable values.
VSNF Virtualisation γu(cycles/bit)1
Snort IDS/IPS VirtualBox 9.5 [33]
Suricata IDS/IPS VirtualBox 8.2 [33]
OpenVPN with AES-NI KVM/QEMU 31 [34]
strongSwan with AES-NI KVM/QEMU 16 [34]
Fortigate-VM NGFW FortiOS 9 [35]
Fortigate-VM SSL VPN FortiOS 13.6 [35]
Fortigate-VM IPSec VPN FortiOS 14.5 [35]
Fortigate-VM Threat protection FortiOS 11.3 [35]
Cisco ASAv Stateful IDS VMware ESX/ESXi 4.2 [36]
Cisco ASAv AES VPN VMware ESX/ESXi 6.9 [36]
Juniper vSRX FW VMware VMXNET3 2.3 [37]
Juniper vSRX IPS VMware VMXNET3 2.4 [37]
Juniper vSRX AppMonitor VMware VMXNET3 1.5 [37]
1 γu=(CPU clock)*(CPU usage)/Throughput. CPU usage is set to 1
(i.e. 100%) when the value is not specified.
Table 4: CPU requirements for some VSNF implementations.
The CPU requirements for the VSNFs are presented in Table 4. It should be noted
that the values of γu (cycle/bit) reported in Table 4 are estimated based on the results
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of experiments reported in scientific papers or product datasheets and obtained under
optimal conditions, with only one VSNF running at a time. The impact on the network
traffic caused by concurrent VSNFs running on the same node are estimated with
Equations (13) and (15). These values of γu have been used to perform the evaluation
tests described in the remainder of this section, with the aim of enabling interested
readers to replicate the experiments in similar conditions. However, we also obtained
comparable results using random values.
2.5.4 Comparison Between Solver and Heuristic
Methodology. In this experiment, we compare the PESS ILP-based algorithm imple-
mented with the solver and the PESS heuristic on the Stanford and GARR network
models, and on Baraba´si-Albert random topologies with 20 nodes and 36 links.
The security service requests are generated using a Poisson process with expo-
nential distribution of inter-arrival and holding times. Once a service expires, the
resources allocated to it are released.
We start by simulating the processing of 105 service requests using the PESS
heuristic. Once a stable network utilisation (load) is reached, we save the subsequent
service requests along with the network state and the heuristic solution. In a second
stage, we run the solver to compute the optimal solution for each of the requests
saved in the previous stage and we compare the results with the recorded heuristic
solutions. This process is repeated with values of network load ranging between 1000
and 20000 Erlang.
Metrics. (i) Heuristic embedding cost overhead over optimal solutions and (ii)
embedding time.
Discussion. As explained in Section 2.4, the PESS heuristic places all the chains
of a service request on a single path to efficiently guarantee that the QoS Constraint
(12) and the region Constraint (17) are respected. Once the path is found, the heuristic
places the VSNFs of all the chains on a maximum of three nodes in the chosen path:
the one with the highest residual computing capacity and the ones specified with the
region constraint (if any). Such implementation choices reduce the solution space in
case of requests with multiple chains and VSNFs. On the other hand, Constraints (12)
and (17) also narrow down the solution space for the solver, often resulting in single-
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path optimal solutions. As a result, we measure a marginal embedding cost overhead
of the heuristic solutions with respect to the optimal solutions on all three evaluation
scenarios (see Table 5).
Network model Heuristic embeddingcost overhead1
Average Time (sec)
Heuristic Solver
Random 0.06% 0.002 150
Stanford 0.07% 0.003 700
GARR 0.5% 0.003 1500
1 Average overhead with respect to the solver embedding cost.
Table 5: Comparison between PESS heuristic and PESS ILP on three network scenarios.
It is worth analysing the reason behind nearly one order of magnitude difference
between the GARR topology and the other two network scenarios. When the initial
solution is computed, the heuristic algorithm selects the endpoint ep2 ∈ EP2 to
further explore the solution space, thus excluding the other endpoints in EP2 (line 11
in Algorithm 1). This strategy improves the scalability of the heuristic in case of large
endpoint sets EP2, at the cost of slightly reducing the quality of the solutions.
In this regard, on the GARR network the border region is used as endpointEP2 for
80% of the requests, to simulate a real-world TSP network where most of the traffic is
directed towards the Internet. Hence, good solutions involving four of the five nodes
in the border are not considered during the second stage of the heuristic, possibly
leading to less accurate solutions. Conversely, a border region of only two nodes is
defined in the Stanford topology (the two border routers), while no special regions
at all are configured for the random networks (thus, always |EP2| = 1), resulting in
more precise embeddings.
As reported in Table 5, the embedding time measured for the heuristic is 3 ms,
on average, with the Stanford and GARR topologies, and below 3 ms, on average,
with the random topologies. In contrast, the solver takes between 150 and 1500 s, on
average, to find the optimal solutions on the three network scenarios. Please note that,
the results related to the GARR network are limited to service requests with less than
10 VSNFs. Due to the size of the GARR topology (46 nodes and 83 links), above this
threshold the solver runs out of memory and it is terminated by the operating system.
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2.5.5 PESS vs Application-agnostic Provisioning
Methodology. We start two experiments in parallel using two identical copies of the
same physical network graph. At each iteration, we generate a service request with
application-specific QoS and security requirements. In Experiment 1, the security ser-
vice is provisioned on one copy of the network with the PESS heuristic. In Experiment
2, the service is provisioned on the second copy of the network by simulating the
standard approach (adopted, for instance, in [26] and used in this test as baseline),
where two application-agnostic chains of VSNFs (one for each direction of the traffic)
are applied to the user traffic to fulfill all the security requirements regardless of
the specific needs of the applications. At the end of each iteration, the two copies
of the network are updated according to the resources consumed by the respective
provisioning approach.
As in the previous experiment, security service requests are generated using a
Poisson process with exponential distribution of inter-arrival and holding times. We
run 105 iterations, starting to collect statistics after the first 8 · 104 requests (once
a stable network load is reached). The two parallel experiments are repeated with
different network load values.
Metrics. Blocking probability, consumption of computing resources, end-to-end
latency of the chains and number of active services in the network.
Discussion. Figure 7 compares the performance of the PESS application-aware
service provisioning algorithm (PESS in the figure) and the baseline approach (Base)
on random networks. The experimental results are plotted as functions of the network
load, which is expressed in terms of the average number of security service requests
in the network (Erlang).
The efficient usage of the computing resources reported in Figure 7(a) is a major
benefit of the application-aware provisioning mechanism proposed in this chapter. In
particular, PESS avoids inefficiencies, such as a high bandwidth video stream being
processed by a high resource demanding IPS (see the CCTV example in Section 2.3),
ultimately leading to a lower blocking probability and to a higher number of active
services in the network, as shown in Figure 7(b) and 7(c) respectively.
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Figure 7: Comparison between the baseline (Base) and the PESS approaches on random networks (20
nodes and 36 links).
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Figure 8: Comparison between the baseline (Base) and the PESS approaches on the GARR network.
The benefits of PESS in terms of reduced end-to-end latency are reported in
Figure 7(d). The plot illustrates the ratio between the average end-to-end latency
of the chains in Experiment 2 (Baseline), and the average end-to-end latency of the
chains in Experiment 1 (PESS). At low loads, when the nodes in the networks of both
experiments are only partially busy, the value of this ratio is between 1.1 and 1.4. In
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Figure 9: Comparison between the baseline (Base) and the PESS approaches on the Stanford backbone
network.
other words, under typical operational conditions, the average end-to-end latency of
chains provisioned with our approach is 10-40% lower than the baseline. Moreover,
when the nodes in Experiment 2 are heavily loaded, the processing delay introduced
by busy nodes becomes very high, as modelled with Equation (12). This phenomenon
produces high ratios, represented by the spike in the plot, which gradually decrease
at high loads when the nodes in the network of Experiment 1 also become fully loaded.
Figure 8 reports the results of the simulations performed with the GARR network.
In this case, we are particularly interested in observing the behaviour of our approach
in the presence of a critical region (from the security viewpoint) such as the border of
the network. In order to analyse this, we empirically configure the random generator
of service requests to generate 80% of requests directed towards the Internet (i.e.,
crossing the border of the network). In Figure 8(b), it can be noted that both PESS
and the baseline have similar blocking probability at low loads (below 6000). This
is a consequence of the bandwidth usage on links towards the border region, which
is almost always identical for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The two curves start
diverging at load 6000, i.e. when the border region runs out of computing resources
with the baseline approach (as shown with dashed curves in Figure 8(a)). The proba-
bility curves in Figure 8(b) begin to re-converge at load 12000, when the border region
with PESS also becomes full. Solid curves in Figure 8(a) indicate that, between loads
1000 and 6000, when the blocking probability of the two experiments is comparable,
PESS requires around 50% less computing resources than the baseline to provision
the security services.
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The results obtained with the Stanford network model are presented in Figure 9.
In contrast to the GARR network, where busy links in sparsely connected areas cause
rejected requests at low loads, in these experiments we see a non-zero blocking prob-
ability only when the border region of the Stanford network runs out of computing
resources, i.e. at loads 4000 and 6000 for the baseline and PESS, respectively.
Similar to the random networks scenario, we can observe a higher number of
active services and a lower end-to-end latency with PESS in both GARR and Stanford
networks. The plots are omitted due to space constraints.
2.5.6 Scalability Evaluation
Methodology. We evaluate the scalability of the PESS heuristic on Baraba´si-Albert
random topologies of between 10 and 1000 nodes. For each of these topologies, we
simulate the processing of 1000 service requests and report the average execution
time.
Metrics. Average execution time.
Discussion. In the first experiment (reported in the leftmost plot of Figure 10) we
used |EP2| = 1 for all the service requests and we varied the attachment parameter
m, which determines the number of edges to attach from a new node to existing
nodes when generating the random network. This influences the execution time of
the shortest path algorithm. For instance, m = 1 produces tree-like topologies with
|E| = |N | − 1. The general rule for computing the number of edges in Baraba´si-Albert
networks is |E| = m·|N |−m2. As illustrated in Figure 10, even for very large networks
with 1000 nodes and 4975 edges (m = 5 in the figure), on average, the PESS heuristic
can provision a security service in around 200 ms.
In the second experiment, we used a fixed value of m = 5 (the worst case in the
first experiment) and we varied the size of endpoint EP2, as the number of nodes in
EP2 determines how long PESS takes to compute the initial solution. In the rightmost
plot in Figure 10, the black solid curve is the reference measurement from the first
experiment. As shown by the dashed curves in the plot, the average execution time
increases linearly with the size of endpoint |EP2|, up to around 250 ms in the worst
case with |N | = 1000, |E| = 4975 and |EP2| = 500.
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Figure 10: Heuristic execution time as a function of the number of physical nodes. The plot on the
left reports the results with m = 1, 3, 5 in the Baraba´si-Albert model when generating random graphs,
while the one on the right side shows the measurements with fixed m = 5 at different sizes of endpoint
EP2.
The VSNFs placement model and heuristic presented in this chapter target NFV-
enabled systems where security services are dynamically provisioned and updated
based on users’ applications and their security and QoS requirements. Such systems
require efficient provisioning strategies to minimize the exposure of such applications
to cyber attacks. With respect to these objectives, the experimental results from the
PESS scalability evaluation are encouraging and clearly indicate the potential for
practical implementation of the proposed application-aware approach in real-world
scenarios.
2.6 Related Work
With the recent “softwarisation” of network resources, a plethora of research initia-
tives has emerged in the last few years to address the problem of the optimal place-
ment of chained VNFs. Most of these tackle the problem by using linear programming
techniques and by proposing heuristic algorithms to cope with large scale problems.
In this section, we classify and review the most relevant works for our studies.
2.6.1 QoS-driven VNF Placement
QoS-driven approaches primarily focus on the QoS requirements of specific services
without considering network security aspects. In this regard, the proposed mathemat-
ical models include bandwidth and latency constraints (similar to Constraints (10) and
(12) presented in Section 2.3) or define objective functions that require minimisation
of the total bandwidth and latency of created chains.
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The ILP model in [38] considers computing and bandwidth constraints to mini-
mize the costs related to (i) VNF deployment, (ii) energy consumption of the servers,
and (iii) forwarding traffic. The end-to-end delay requirement is formulated as a
penalty in the objective function. However, the computation of the end-to-end delay
only considers link propagation delays without including the processing delay intro-
duced at each VNF. In [39], the placement problem is formulated as a Mixed Integer
Quadratically Constrained Problem with respect to bandwidth, number of used nodes
and latency. The processing delay at each VNF is also not considered in this work.
The study in [40] proposes an ILP formulation and a heuristic algorithm for the VNF
placement problem focusing on QoS parameters such as end-to-end delay and NSC
availability. The ILP model formulation presented in the paper does not discuss how
the processing delay introduced by the VNFs is computed. This limitation is reflected
in the assumptions made for the evaluation, where the processing delay is considered
independent from the VNF type/implementation and from the computing capacity
of the physical node where VNFs are placed.
In [41], Tajiki et al. present a resource allocation architecture for softwarised net-
works. The proposed architecture includes two resource allocation modules whose
goal is configuring the network while satisfying QoS constraints and optimising the
energy consumption and the number of flow entries in the network. Although the
authors tackle the problem of progressively allocating resources for newly arrived
flows, neither the ILP formulation nor the heuristic algorithm consider the effects
of the resource allocation on servers whose computing capacity is close to the limit.
As discussed in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4, this may lead to a degradation of the QoS of
existing services in terms of higher end-to-end latency.
2.6.2 Placement of VNFs/VSNFs
In addition to the research work on QoS-driven VNFs placement, there are a number
of works that specifically consider the placement of VSNFs.
The method proposed in [42] is based on light-weight, protocol-specific intrusion
detection VNFs. The system dynamically invokes a chain of these IDSs according
to the traffic characteristics. The placement of the chains is based on a user-defined
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or common shortest-path algorithm such as Dijkstra, without consideration of the
application QoS requirements or available network/computing resources.
In [43], the authors argue that reactive mechanisms used by cloud providers to
deploy VSNFs do not ensure an optimal resource allocation. To address this, the
authors propose a novel resource allocation scheme, which estimates the behaviour
of the traffic load by monitoring the history of the current VSNFs, and pro-actively
provisions new instances of those VSNFs as a countermeasure to any incoming
resource pressure. The proposed algorithm does not tackle the problem of VSNF
chaining. Instead, it focuses on the optimal placement of new instances of VSNFs,
which are part of existing chains. It also assumes infinite network and computing
resources.
In [44], Dermici et al. tackle the VSNFs placement problem by proposing an ILP
formulation whose objective is the minimisation of the energy consumption of servers.
This solution does not consider any security nor QoS constraints. The aim of the NSC
embedding model presented in [45] is to minimize the end-to-end latency of cross-
domain chains of VSNFs. The main limitation of the proposed ILP formulation is
that it only considers link propagation delays, while ignoring the processing delay
introduced at each VSNF.
2.6.3 Security-driven VSNF Placement
Although the literature reviewed in Section 2.6.2 addresses the placement of VSNFs,
few solutions have been proposed with a focus on the network security requirements
of the VSNF placement. In [26], the authors propose a model for the placement of
VSNFs that takes into account security deployment constraints. Such constraints
are necessary to avoid incorrect deployment of security functions such as placing
an IDS on an encrypted channel. The authors propose an ILP formulation of the
problem and validate their model by measuring the execution time in four different
scenarios and by comparing the model with other heuristics in terms of placement
cost. However, the proposed optimisation algorithm is always computed for all flows
in the network. Therefore, it does not scale well. The authors mitigate the problem
by partitioning the network into independent blocks. Nevertheless, the partitioning
scheme is limited to fat-tree topologies. Furthermore, the end-to-end latency is not
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considered among the constraints of the proposed model, which limits its application
space. The authors of [46] propose an ILP formulation and a heuristic algorithm
for efficiently composing chains of virtual security functions. The ILP formulation
includes a single security-related constraint to ensure that the security level of each
deployed VSNF instance is higher than the security level required by the service
request. However, this work does not take into account basic security aspects, such
as order and operational mode (stateful/stateless) of the chained VSNFs. Moreover,
the proposed formulation does not consider the mutual interference between security
services caused by the concurrent access to the (finite) computing resources available
in the infrastructure. The latter aspect is particularly relevant in a TSP scenario (see
also part II of [47]), where the security services are provisioned in a dynamic manner
based on the incoming customers’ requests.
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3 DDoS Detection with Deep Learning
T he challenge of DDoS detection is the combination of attack approaches coupledwith the volume of live traffic to be analysed. In this chapter, we present a prac-
tical, lightweight deep learning DDoS detection system called LUCID (Lightweight,
Usable CNN in DDoS Detection), which exploits the properties of Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs) to classify traffic flows as either malicious or benign.
LUCID is a lightweight DL-based DDoS detection architecture suitable for online
resource-constrained environments, which leverages CNNs to learn the behaviour
of DDoS and benign traffic flows with both low processing overhead and attack
detection time. LUCID has been trained with the latest datasets consisting of several
days of network activity, including DDoS attack traffic generated with well-known
tools widely used by hackers groups such as Anonymous [48]. These datasets have
been pre-processed to produce traffic observations consistent with those collected in
online systems, where the detection algorithms must cope with segments of traffic
flows collected over pre-defined time windows.
We demonstrate that LUCID matches state-of-the-art detection accuracy whilst
presenting a 40x reduction in processing time. With our evaluation results, we prove
that the proposed approach is suitable for effective DDoS detection in resource-
constrained operational environments, such as edge computing facilities, where de-
vices possess limited computing capabilities.
The research work presented in this chapter has been carried out in collaboration
with the Queen’s University Belfast’s Centre for Secure Information Technologies.
Moreover, the results have been accepted for publication in the IEEE Transactions on
Network and Service Management [49].
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 provides the
motivation behind this work. Section 3.2 details the methodology with respect to
the network traffic processing and the LUCID CNN model architecture. Section 3.3
describes the experimental setup detailing the datasets and the development of LUCID
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with the hyper-parameter tuning process. In Section 3.4, LUCID is evaluated and
compared with the state-of-the-art approaches. Section 3.5 introduces our kernel
activation analysis for explainability of LUCID’s classification process. Section 3.6
presents the experiment and results for the DDoS detection at the edge. Section 3.7
reviews and discusses the related work.
3.1 Motivation
DDoS attacks are one of the most harmful threats in today’s Internet, disrupting the
availability of essential services in production systems and everyday life. Although
DDoS attacks have been known to the network research community since the early
1980s, our network defences against these attacks still prove inadequate.
In late 2016, the attack on the Domain Name Server (DNS) provider, Dyn, provided
a worrying demonstration of the potential disruption from targeted DDoS attacks
[50]. This particular attack leveraged a botnet (Mirai) of unsecured IoT (Internet of
Things) devices affecting more than 60 services. At the time, this was the largest
DDoS attack recorded, at 600 Gbps. This was exceeded in February 2018 with a major
DDoS attack towards Github [51]. At its peak, the victim saw incoming traffic at
a rate of 1.3 Tbps. The attackers leveraged a vulnerability present in memcached,
a popular database caching tool. In this case, an amplification attack was executed
using a spoofed source IP address (the victim IP address). If globally implemented,
BCP38 “Network Ingress Filtering” [52] could mitigate such an attack by blocking
packets with spoofed IP addresses from progressing through the network. However,
these two examples illustrate that scale rather than sophistication enables the DDoS
to succeed.
In recent years, DDoS attacks have become more difficult to detect due to the
many combinations of attack approaches. For example, multi-vector attacks where
an attacker uses a combination of multiple protocols for the DDoS are common. In
order to combat the diversity of attack techniques, more nuanced and more robust de-
fence techniques are required. Traditional signature-based intrusion detection systems
cannot react to new attacks. Existing statistical anomaly-based detection systems are
constrained by the requirement to define thresholds for detection. Network Intrusion
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Detection Systems (NIDSs) using machine learning techniques are being explored
to address the limitations of existing solutions. In this category, DL systems have
been shown to be very effective in discriminating DDoS traffic from benign traffic
by deriving high-level feature representations of the traffic from low-level, granular
features of packets [53], [54]. However, many existing DL-based approaches described
in the scientific literature are too resource-intensive from the training perspective,
and lack the pragmatism for real-world deployment. Specifically, current solutions
are not designed for online attack detection within the constraints of a live network
where detection algorithms must process traffic flows that can be split across multiple
capture time windows.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), a specific DL technique, have grown in
popularity in recent times leading to major innovations in computer vision [55], [56],
[57] and Natural Language Processing [58], as well as various niche areas such as
protein binding prediction [59], [60], machine vibration analysis [61] and medical
signal processing [62]. Whilst their use is still under-researched in cybersecurity
generally, the application of CNNs has advanced the state-of-the-art in certain specific
scenarios such as malware detection [63], [64], [65], [66], code analysis [67], network
traffic analysis [53], [68], [69], [70], [71] and intrusion detection in industrial control
systems [72]. These successes, combined with the benefits of CNN with respect to
reduced feature engineering and high detection accuracy, motivate us to employ
CNNs in our work.
While large CNN architectures have been proven to provide state-of-the-art detec-
tion rates, less attention has been given to minimise their size while maintaining
competent performance in limited resource environments. As observed with the
Dyn attack and the Mirai botnet, the opportunity for launching DDoS attacks from
unsecured IoT devices is increasing as we deploy more IoT devices on our networks.
This leads to consideration of the placement of the defence mechanism. Mitigation of
attacks such as the Mirai and Memcached examples include the use of high-powered
appliances with the capacity to absorb volumetric DDoS attacks. These appliances
are located locally at the enterprise or in the Cloud. With the drive towards edge
computing to improve service provision, it becomes relevant to consider the ability to
both protect against attacks closer to the edge and on resource-constrained devices.
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Indeed, even without resource restrictions, it is valuable to minimize resource usage
for maximum system output.
3.2 Methodology
In this chapter we present LUCID, a CNN-based solution for DDoS detection that can
be deployed in online resource-constrained environments. Our CNN encapsulates the
learning of malicious activity from traffic to enable the identification of DDoS patterns
regardless of their temporal positioning. This is a fundamental benefit of CNNs; to
produce the same output regardless of where a pattern appears in the input. This
encapsulation and learning of features whilst training the model removes the need
for excessive feature engineering, ranking and selection. To support an online attack
detection system, we use a novel preprocessing method for the network traffic that
generates a spatial data representation used as input to the CNN. In this section, we
introduce the network traffic preprocessing method, the CNN model architecture, and
the learning procedure.
α Learning rate n Number of packets per sample
f Number of features per packet s Batch size
h Height of convolutional filters t Time window duration
id 5-tuple flow identifier τ Time window start time
k Number of convolutional filters E Array of labelled samples
m Max pooling size L Set of labels
Table 6: Glossary of symbols.
3.2.1 Network Traffic Preprocessing
Network traffic is comprised of data flows between endpoints. Due to the shared
nature of the communication link, packets from different data flows are multiplexed
resulting in packets from the same flow being separated for transmission. This means
that the processing for live presentation of traffic to a NIDS is quite different to the
processing of a static dataset comprising complete flows. For the same reason, the
ability to generate flow-level statistics, as relied upon by many of the existing works
described in Section 3.7, is not feasible in an online system.
In order to develop our online NIDS, we created a tool that converts the traffic
flows extracted from network traffic traces of a dataset into array-like data structures
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Algorithm 2 Network traffic preprocessing algorithm
Input: Network traffic trace (NTT ), flow-level labels (L), time window (t), max packets/sample (n)
Output: List of labelled samples (E)
1: procedure PREPROCESSING(NTT , L, t, n)
2: E ← ∅ . Initialise the set of samples
3: τ ← −1 . Initialise the time window start-time
4: for all pkt ∈ NTT do . Loop over the packets
5: id← pkt.tuple . 5-tuple flow identifier
6: if τ == −1 or pkt.time > τ + t then
7: τ ← pkt.time . Time window start time
8: end if
9: if
∣∣E [τ, id]∣∣ < n then . Max n pkts/sample
10: E [τ, id].pkts.append(pkt.features)
11: end if
12: end for
13: E ← normalisation padding(E)
14: for all e ∈ E do . Labelling
15: e.label← L[e.id] . Apply the label to the sample
16: end for
17: return E
18: end procedure
and splits them into sub-flows based on time windows. Shaping the input as packet
flows in this manner creates a spatial data representation, which allows the CNN to
learn the characteristics of DDoS attacks and benign traffic through the convolutional
filters sliding over such input to identify salient patterns. This form of input is
compatible with traffic captured in online deployments. The process is illustrated
in Algorithm 2 and described next. The symbols are defined in Table 6.
Feature extraction. Given a traffic trace file from the dataset and a pre-defined
time window of length t seconds, the algorithm collects all the packets from the file
with capture time between t0, the capture time of the first packet, and time t0+t. From
each packet, the algorithm extracts 11 attributes (see Table 7). We intuitively exclude
those attributes that would be detrimental to the generalisation of the model, such as
IP addresses and TCP/UDP ports (specific to the end-hosts and user applications),
link layer encapsulation type (linked to the network interfaces) and application-layer
attributes (e.g., IRC or HTTP protocol attributes).
Data processing algorithm. This procedure, described in Algorithm 2 at lines 4-
12, simulates the traffic capturing process of online IDSs, where the traffic is collected
for a certain amount of time t before being sent to the anomaly detection algorithms.
Hence, such algorithms must base their decisions on portions of traffic flows, without
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Pkt #
Time
(sec)1
Packet
Len
Highest
Layer2
IP
Flags
Protocols3
TCP
Len
TCP
Ack
TCP
Flags
TCP
WSize
UDP
Len
ICMP
Type
Pa
ck
et
s

0 0 151 99602525 0x4000 0011010001000b 85 336 0x018 1444 0 0
1 0.092 135 99602525 0x4000 0011010001000b 69 453 0x018 510 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
j 0.513 66 78354535 0x4000 0010010001000b 0 405 0x010 1444 0 0
Pa
dd
in
g

j + 1 0 0 0 0 0000000000000b 0 0 0 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
n 0 0 0 0 0000000000000b 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 Relative time from the first packet of the flow.
2 Numerical representation of the highest layer recognised in the packet.
3 Binary representation of the list of protocols recognised in the packet using the well-known Bag-of-Words (BoW) model.
It includes protocols from Layer 2 (arp) to common clear text application layer protocols such as http, telnet, ftp and dns.
Table 7: A TCP flow sample before normalisation.
the knowledge of their whole life. To simulate this process, the attributes of the
packets belonging to the same bi-directional traffic flow are grouped in chronological
order to form an example of shape [n, f ] (as shown in Table 7), where f is the number
of features (11) and n is the maximum number of packets the parsing process collects
for each flow within the time window. t and n are hyper-parameters for our CNN.
Flows longer than n are truncated, while shorter flows are zero-padded at the end
during the next stage after normalisation. The same operations are repeated for the
packets within time window [t0 + t, t0 + 2t] and so on, until the end of the file.
Logically, we hypothesize that short time windows enable the online systems to
detect DDoS attacks within a very short time frame. Conversely, higher values of t
and n offer more information on flows to the detection algorithms, which we expect
to result in higher detection accuracy. The sensitivity of our CNN to the values of t
and n is evaluated in Section 3.3.
The output of this process can be seen as a bi-dimensional array of samples (E [τ, id]
in Algorithm 2). A row of the array represents the samples whose packets have been
captured in the same time window, whilst a column represents the samples whose
packets belong to the same bi-directional flow. A graphical representation of array E
is provided in Figure 11.
Normalisation and padding. Each attribute value is normalised to a [0, 1] scale and
the samples are zero-padded so that each sample is of fixed length n, since having
samples of fixed length is a requirement for a CNN to be able to learn over a full
sample set. In Figure 11, each non-empty element of the array E is a compact graphical
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Figure 11: Graphical representation of E .
representation of a sample. In each E element, coloured rows are the packets in the
form of 11 normalised attributes (i.e., the upper part of Table 7), while the white rows
represent the zero-padding (i.e., the lower part of Table 7). Please note that, empty
elements in Figure 11 are for visualisation only and are not included in the dataset. An
empty E [τ, id] means that no packets of flow id have been captured in time window
[τ, τ + t] (e.g., E [t0, F4]).
Labelling. Each example E [τ, id] is labelled by matching its flow identifier id
with the labels provided with the original dataset (lines 14-16 in Algorithm 2). This
also means that the value of the label is constant along each column of array E , as
represented in Figure 11.
3.2.2 LUCID Model Architecture
We take the output from Algorithm 2 as input to our CNN model for the purposes
of online attack detection. LUCID classifies traffic flows into one of two classes,
either malicious (DDoS) or benign. Our objective is to minimise the complexity and
performance time of this CNN model for feasible deployment on resource-constrained
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Figure 12: LUCID architecture.
devices. To achieve this, the proposed approach is a lightweight, supervised detection
system that incorporates a CNN, similar to that of [58] from the field of Natural
Language Processing. CNNs have shared and reused parameters with regard to the
weights of the kernels, whereas in a traditional neural network every weight is used
only once. This reduces the storage and memory requirements of our model. The
complete architecture is depicted in Figure 12 and described in the next sections, with
the hyper-parameter tuning and ablation studies being discussed in Section 3.3.
Input layer. Recall that each traffic flow has been reshaped into a 2-D matrix of
packet features as per Section 3.2.1, creating a novel spatial representation that enables
the CNN to learn the correlation between packets of the same flow. Thus, this first
layer takes as input a traffic flow represented by a matrix F of size n×f . F contains n
individual packet vectors, such that F = {pkt1, ... , pktn} where pktn is the nth packet
in a flow, and each packet vector has length f = 11 features.
CNN layer. As per Figure 12, each input matrix F is operated on by a single
convolutional layer with k filters of size h × f , with h being the length of each filter,
and again f = 11. Each filter, also known as a kernel or sliding window, convolves over
F with a step of 1 to extract and learn local features that contain useful information
for detection of DDoS and benign flows. Each of the k filters generates an activation
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map a of size (n− h + 1), such that ak = ReLU(Conv(F )Wk, bk), where Wk and bk are
the weight and bias parameters of the kth filter that are learned during the training
stage. To introduce non-linearity among the learned filters, we use the rectified linear
activation function ReLU(x) = max{0, x}, as per convention for CNNs. All activation
maps are stacked, creating an activation matrix A of size (n − h + 1) × k, such that
A = [a1|...|ak].
There are two main benefits of including a CNN in our architecture. Firstly,
it allows the model to benefit from efficiency gains compared to standard neural
networks, since the weights in each filter are reused across the whole input. Sharing
weights, instead of the full end-to-end connectivity with a standard neural net, makes
the model more lightweight and reduces its memory footprint as the number of
learnable parameters is greatly reduced. Secondly, during the training phase, the CNN
automatically learns the weights and biases of each filter such that the learning of
salient characteristics and features is encapsulated inside the resulting model during
training. This reduces the time-consuming feature engineering and ranking involved
in statistical and traditional machine learning methods, which relies on expert human
knowledge. As a result, this model is more adaptable to new subtleties of DDoS
attack, since the training stage can be simply repeated anytime with fresh training
data without having to craft and rank new features.
Max pooling layer. For max pooling, we down-sample along the first dimension
of A, which represents the temporal nature of the input. A pool size of m produces an
output matrix mo of size ((n− h+ 1)/m)× k, which contains the largest m activations
of each learned filter, such that mo = [max(a1)|...|max(ak)]. In this way, the model
disregards the less useful information that produced smaller activations, instead
paying attention to the larger activations. This also means that we dispose of the
positional information of the activation, i.e. where it occurred in the original flow,
giving a more compressed feature encoding, and, in turn, reducing the complexity of
the network. mo is then flattened to produce the final one-dimensional feature vector
v to be input to the classification layer.
Classification layer. v is input to a fully-connected layer of the same size, and
the output layer has a sole node. This output x is passed to the sigmoid activation
function such that σ(x) = 1/(1 + e−x). This constrains the activation to a value of
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between 0 and 1, hence returning the probability p ∈ [0, 1] of a given flow being a
malicious DDoS attack. The flow is classified as DDoS when p > 0.5, and benign
otherwise.
3.2.3 The Learning Procedure
When training LUCID, the objective is to minimise its cost function through iteratively
updating all the weights and biases contained within the model. These weights
and biases are also known as trainable, or learnable, parameters. The cost function
calculates the cost, also called the error or the loss, between the model’s prediction,
and the ground truth of the input. Hence by minimising this cost function, we reduce
the prediction error. At each iteration in training, the input data is fed forward through
the network, the error calculated, and then this error is back-propagated through the
network. This continues until convergence is reached, when further updates don’t
reduce the error any further, or the training process reaches the set maximum number
of epochs. With two classes in our problem the binary cross-entropy cost function is
used. Formally this cost function c that calculates the error over a batch of s samples
can be written as:
c = −1
s
s∑
j=1
(yj log pj + (1− yj) log(1− pj)) (20)
where yj is the ground truth target label for each flow j in the batch of s samples,
and pj is the predicted probability flow j is malicious DDoS. This is supervised
learning because each flow in our datasets is labelled with the ground truth, either
DDoS or benign. To reduce bias in our learning procedure, we ensure that these
datasets are balanced with equal numbers of malicious and benign flows, which
gives a greater degree of confidence that the model is learning the correct feature
representations from the patterns in the traffic flows. As previously highlighted, the
learning is encapsulated inside the model by all the weights and biases, meaning
that our approach does not require significant expert input to craft bespoke features
and statistically assess their importance during preprocessing, unlike many existing
methods, as outlined in Section 3.7.
57
3.3 Experimental Setup
3.3.1 Datasets
Our CNN model is validated with recent datasets ISCX2012 [73], CIC2017 [74] and
CSECIC2018 [75] provided by the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity of the University
of New Brunswick (UNB), Canada. They consist of several days of network activity,
normal and malicious, including DDoS attacks. The three datasets are publicly avail-
able in the form of traffic traces in pcap format including full packet payloads, plus
supplementary text files containing the labels and statistical details for each traffic
flow.
The UNB researchers have generated these datasets by using profiles to accu-
rately represent the abstract properties of human and attack behaviours. One profile
characterises the normal network activities and provides distribution models for
applications and protocols (HTTP, SMTP, SSH, IMAP, POP3 and FTP) produced
with the analysis of real traffic traces. Other profiles describe a variety of attack
scenarios based on recent security reports. They are used to mimic the behaviour of
the malicious attackers by means of custom botnets and well-known DDoS attacking
tools such as High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC) [48] and its predecessor, the Low Orbit
Ion Cannon (LOIC) [76]. HOIC and LOIC have been widely used by Anonymous and
other hacker groups in some highly-publicised attacks against PayPal, Mastercard,
Visa, Amazon, Megaupload, among others [77].
Table 8 shows the parts of the three datasets used in this work. In the table, the
column Traffic trace specifies the name of the trace, according to [73], [74] and [75].
Specifically, the ISCX2012-Tue15 trace contains a DDoS attack based on an IRC botnet.
The CIC2017-Fri7PM trace contains a HTTP DDoS generated with LOIC, while the
CSECIC2018-Wed21 trace contains a HTTP DDoS generated with HOIC. With respect
to the original file, the trace CIC2017-Fri7PM is reduced to timeslot 3.30PM-5.00PM to
exclude malicious packets related to other cyber attacks (port scans and backdoors).
In an initial design, the model was trained and validated on the ISCX2012 dataset
producing high accuracy results. However, testing the model on the CIC2017 dataset
confirmed the generally held observation that a model trained on one dataset will not
necessarily perform well on a completely new dataset. In particular, we obtained a
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Dataset Traffic trace #Flows #Benign #DDoS
ISCX2012 Tue15 571698 534320 37378
CIC2017 Fri7PM 225745 97718 128027
CSECIC2018 Wed21 1048575 360832 687743
Table 8: The datasets from UNB [78].
false negative rate of about 17%. This can be attributed to the different attacks rep-
resented in the two datasets, as previously described. What we attempt in this work
is to develop a model that when trained and validated across a mixed dataset can
reproduce the high performance results on completely unseen test data. To achieve
this, a combined training dataset is generated as described in Sec. 3.3.2.
3.3.2 Data Preparation
We extract the 37378 DDoS flows from ISCX2012, plus randomly select 37378 be-
nign flows from the same year to balance. We repeat this process with 97718/97718
benign/DDoS flows for CIC2017 and again with 360832/360832 benign/DDoS flows
for CSECIC2018.
After the pre-preprocessing stage, where flows are translated into array-like data
structures (Section 3.2.1), each of the three datasets is split into training (90%) and
test (10%) sets, with 10% of the training set used for validation. Please note that, the
split operation is performed on a per-flow basis to ensure that samples obtained from
the same traffic flow end up in the same split, hence avoiding the “contamination”
of the validation and test splits with data used for the training. We finally combine
the training splits from each year by balancing them with equal proportions from
each year to produce a single training set. We do the same with the validation and
test splits, to obtain a final dataset referred to as UNB201X in the rest of the chapter.
UNB201X training and validation sets are only used for training the model and tuning
the hyper-parameters (Section 3.3.4), while the test set is used for the evaluation
presented in Sections 3.4 and 3.6, either as a whole combined test set, or as individual
per-year test sets for state-of-the-art comparison.
A summary of the final UNB201X splits is presented in Table 9, which reports the
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number of samples as a function of time window duration t. As illustrated in Table
9, low values of this hyper-parameter yield larger numbers of samples. Intuitively,
using short time windows leads to splitting traffic flows into many small fragments
(ultimately converted into samples), while long time windows produce the opposite
result. In contrast, the value of n has a negligible impact on the final number of
samples in the dataset.
Time
Window
Total
Samples Training Validation Test
t=1s 480519 389190 43272 48057
t=2s 353058 285963 31782 35313
t=3s 310590 251574 27957 31059
t=4s 289437 234438 26055 28944
t=5s 276024 223569 24852 27603
t=10s 265902 215379 23931 26592
t=20s 235593 190827 21204 23562
t=50s 227214 184041 20451 22722
t=100s 224154 181551 20187 22416
Table 9: UNB201X dataset splits.
3.3.3 Evaluation Methodology
As per convention in the literature, we report the metrics Accuracy (ACC), False Positive
Rate (FPR), Precision (or Positive Predictive Value (PPV)), Recall (or True Positive Rate
(TPR)) and F1 Score (F1), with a focus on the latter. Accuracy is the percentage of
correctly classified samples (both benign and DDoS). FPR represents the percentage
of samples that are falsely classified as DDoS. PPV is the ratio between the correctly
detected DDoS samples and all the detected DDoS samples (true and false). TPR
represents the percentage of DDoS samples that are correctly classified as such. The
F1 Score is an overall measure of a model’s performance; that is the harmonic mean
of the PPV and TPR. These metrics are formally defined as follows:
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
PPV =
TP
TP + FP
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
F1 = 2 · PPV · TPR
PPV + TPR
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where TP=True Positives, TN=True Negatives, FP=False Positives, FN=False Negatives.
The output of the training process is a combination of trainable and hyper pa-
rameters that maximizes the F1 Score on the validation set or, in other words, that
minimizes the total number of False Positives and False Negatives.
Model training and validation have been performed on a server-class computer
equipped with two 16-core Intel Xeon Silver 4110 @2.1 GHz CPUs and 64 GB of RAM.
The models have been implemented in Python v3.6 using the Keras API v2.2.4 [79]
on top of Tensorflow 1.13.1 [80].
3.3.4 Hyper-parameter Tuning
Tuning the hyper-parameters is an important step to optimise the model’s accuracy,
as their values influence the model complexity and the learning process. Prior to our
experiments, we empirically chose the hyper-parameter values based on the results of
preliminary tuning and on the motivations described per parameter. We then adopted
a grid search strategy to explore the set of hyper-parameters using F1 score as the
performance metric. At each point in the grid, the training continues indefinitely and
stops when the loss does not decrease for a consecutive 25 times. Then, the search
process saves the F1 score and moves to the next point.
As per Section 3.3.2, UNB201X is split into training, validation and testing sets. For
hyper-parameter tuning, we use only the validation set. It is important to highlight
that we do not tune to the test set, as that may artificially improve performance.
The test set is kept completely unseen, solely for use in generating our experimental
results, which are reported in Section 3.4.
Learning Rate. The learning rate α ∈ (0, 1] controls the speed at which the model
learns. Common practice is to start with α = 0.1 and then progressively reduce the
order of magnitude (0.01, 0.001, etc.). We trained our model using the Adam optimizer
[81] starting with α = 0.1, 0.01, 0.001 and no learning rate decay. As the optimizer
could not converge with α = 0.1 in the case of 32 or more convolutional filters, and it
converged too slowly with α = 0.001, we set α = 0.01.
Batch Size. The batch size s is the number of training samples used in one
training iteration. The value of the batch size is usually increased by a power of two
(e.g., 1, 2, 4, etc.). Lower values of s mean higher number of forward and backward
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propagations for each epoch, hence possibly higher accuracy but also longer learning
time. As we did not experience any substantial variation in the F1 Score while varying
s in the preliminary tests, we empirically limited the tuning of the batch size to
s = 1024, 2048. We experimented with both values in this tuning phase.
Maximum number of packets/sample. n is important for the characterisation of
the traffic and for capturing the temporal patterns of traffic flows. The value of n
indicates the maximum number of packets of a flow recorded in chronological order
in a sample.
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Figure 13: Sensitivity of our model to hyper-parameter n.
The resulting set of packets describes a portion of the life of the flow in a given
time window, including the (relative) time information of packets. Repetition-based
DDoS attacks use a small set of messages at approximately constant rates, therefore a
small value of n is sufficient to spot the temporal patterns among the packet features,
hence requiring a limited number of trainable parameters. On the other hand, more
complex attacks, such as the ones performed with the HOIC tool, which uses multiple
HTTP headers to make the requests appear legitimate, might require a larger number
of packets to achieve the desired degree of accuracy. Given the variety of DDoS tools
used to simulate the attack traffic in the dataset (IRC-based bot, LOIC and HOIC), we
experimented with n ranging between 1 and 100, and we compared the performance
in terms of F1 score. The results are provided in Figure 13 for different durations
of time window t, but at fixed values of the other hyper-parameters for the sake of
visualisation.
The F1 score steadily increases with the value of n when n < 5, and then stabilises
62
when n ≥ 5. However, an increase in F1 score is still observed up to n = 100. Although,
a low value of n can be used to speed up the detection time (less convolutions)
and to reduce the requirements in terms of storage and RAM (smaller sample size),
which links to our objective of a lightweight implementation, we wish to balance high
accuracy with low resource consumption. This will be demonstrated in Section 3.6.
Time Window. The time window t is used to simulate the capturing process of
online systems (see Section 3.2.1). We evaluated the F1 score for time windows ranging
between 1 and 100 seconds (as in the related work e.g., [53]) at different values of n.
The results are shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Sensitivity of our model to hyper-parameter t.
Although the number of samples in the training set decreases when t increases
(see Table 9), the CNN is relatively insensitive to this hyper-parameter for n > 1.
With n = 1, the traffic flows are represented by samples of shape [1, f ], i.e. only one
packet/sample, irrespective of the duration of the time window. In such a corner
case, since the CNN cannot correlate the attributes of different packets within the
same sample, the F1 score is more influenced by the number of samples in the training
set (the more samples, the better).
Number of convolutional filters. The higher the number of convolutional filters
k, the more features are learned by the CNN, but also the larger the number of
trainable parameters in the model (hence longer training time). Common practice is
to experiment by increasing the value of this hyper-parameter by powers of 2 (e.g.,
k = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64).
Figure 15 shows the F1 score as a function of k. For the sake of readability, the plot
in the figure only reports the results obtained with one single set of the other hyper-
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Figure 15: Sensitivity of our model to hyper-parameter k.
parameters. However, similar trends have been observed with other combinations.
It can be concluded that the performance improved with the number of filters up
to a point (32/64 filters) where no performance gain is obtained, and increasing the
number of filters will only increase the computational time.
Height of convolutional filters. h determines the height of the filters (the width
is fixed to 11, the number of features), i.e. the number of packets to involve in each
matrix operation. Testing with h = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, we observed a small, but noticeable,
difference in the F1 score between h = 1 (0.9934) and h = 3 (0.9950), with no major
improvement beyond h = 3 (Figure 16).
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Figure 16: Sensitivity of our model to hyper-parameter h.
Pooling Size. m determines the pooling size of the max-pooling operation applied
to the output of the convolution. By using m = n − h + 1 we max pooled over the
whole length of each activation map generated by each filter, known as global max
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pooling. The global max-pooling reduces the shape of the next hidden layer to [1, 1, k],
i.e. one single output unit per convolutional filter.
Resulting hyper-parameter set. After conducting a comprehensive grid search on
more than 5000 combinations of hyper-parameters, we have selected the CNN model
configuration that maximises the F1 score on the UNB201X validation set (Table 10).
That is:
n = 100, t = 100, k = 64, h = 3, m = 98
The resulting model, trained with learning rate α = 0.01 and batch size s = 2048,
consists of 2241 trainable parameters, 2176 for the convolutional layer (h · f units
for each filter plus bias, multiplied by the number of filters K) and 65 for the fully
connected layer (64 units plus bias).
As previously noted, other configurations may present lower resource require-
ments at the cost of a minimal decrease in F1 score. For example, using k = 32 would
reduce the number of convolutions by half, while n = 10, 20, 50 would also require
fewer convolutions and a smaller memory footprint. However, setting n = 100 not
only maximises the F1 score, but also enables a fair comparison with state-of-the-
art approaches such as DeepDefense [53] (Section 3.4), where the authors trained
their neural networks using n = 100 (in [53], the hyper-parameter is denoted as T ).
Furthermore, the chosen configuration enables a worst-case analysis for resource-
constrained scenarios such as that presented in Section 3.6.
These hyper-parameters are kept constant throughout our experiments presented
in Sections 3.4 and 3.6.
Validation set ACC FPR PPV TPR F1
UNB201X 0.9950 0.0083 0.9917 0.9983 0.9950
Table 10: Scores obtained on the UNB201X validation set.
3.4 Results
In this section, we present a detailed evaluation of the proposed approach with the
datasets presented in Sec. 3.3.1. Evaluation metrics of Accuracy (ACC), False Positive
65
Rate (FPR), Precision (PPV), Recall (TPR) and F1 Score (F1) have been used for perfor-
mance measurement and for comparison with state-of-the-art models.
3.4.1 Detection Accuracy
In order to validate our approach and the results obtained on the validation dataset,
we measure the performance of LUCID in classifying unseen traffic flows as benign
or malicious (DDoS). Table 11 summarizes the results obtained on the various test
sets produced through the procedure described in Section 3.3.2. As illustrated, the
very high performance is maintained across the range of test datasets indicating the
robustness of the LUCID design. These results are further discussed in Section 3.4.2,
where we compare our solution with state-of-the-art works reported in the scientific
literature.
Test set ACC FPR PPV TPR F1
ISCX2012 0.9888 0.0179 0.9827 0.9952 0.9889
CIC2017 0.9967 0.0059 0.9939 0.9994 0.9966
CSECIC2018 0.9987 0.0016 0.9984 0.9989 0.9987
UNB201X 0.9946 0.0087 0.9914 0.9979 0.9946
Table 11: LUCID detection performance on the test sets.
The results show that thanks to the properties of its CNN, LUCID learns to dis-
tinguish between patterns of malicious DDoS behaviour and benign flows. Given
the properties of convolutional methods, these patterns are recognised regardless of
the position they occupy in a flow, demonstrating that our spatial representation
of a flow is robust. Irrespective of whether the DDoS event appears at the start
or the end of the input, LUCID will produce the same representation in its output.
Although the temporal dynamics in DDoS attacks might suggest that alternative DL
architectures may seem more suitable (e.g., Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)), our
novel preprocessing method combined with the CNN removes the requirement for
the model to maintain temporal context of each whole flow as the data is pushed
through the network. In comparison, LSTMs are known to be very difficult to train,
and their performance is inherently slower for long sequences compared to CNNs.
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3.4.2 State-Of-The-Art Comparison
For a fair comparison between LUCID and the state-of-the-art, we focus our analysis
on solutions that have validated the UNB datasets for DDoS attack detection.
We have paid particular attention to DeepDefense [53] as, similar to our approach,
the model is trained with packet attributes rather than flow-level statistics used
in other works. DeepDefense translates the pcap files of ISCX2012 into arrays that
contain packet attributes collected within sliding time windows. The label assigned
to a sample is the label of the last packet in the time window, according to the labels
provided with the original dataset. The proposed data preprocessing technique is
similar to LUCID’s. However, in LUCID, a sample corresponds to a single traffic flow,
whereas in DeepDefense a sample represents the traffic collected in a time window.
Of the four DL models presented in the DeepDefense paper, the one called 3LSTM
produces the highest scores in the classification of DDoS traffic. Therefore, we have
implemented 3LSTM for comparison purposes. The architecture of this model in-
cludes 6 LSTM layers of 64 neurons each, 2 fully connected layers of 128 neurons
each, and 4 batch normalisation layers. To directly compare the DL models, we have
trained 3LSTM on the UNB201X training set with n = 100 and t = 100 as done with
LUCID. We have compared our implementation of 3LSTM with LUCID on each of the
four test sets, and present the F1 score results in Table 12.
Model TrainableParameters
ISCX
2012
CIC
2017
CSECIC
2018
UNB
201X
LUCID 2241 0.9889 0.9966 0.9987 0.9946
3LSTM 1004889 0.9880 0.9968 0.9987 0.9943
Table 12: LUCID-DeepDefense comparison (F1 score).
The results presented in Table 12 show that LUCID and 3LSTM are comparable in
terms of F1 score across the range of test datasets. However, in terms of computation
time, LUCID outperforms 3LSTM in detection time. Specifically, as measured on
the Intel Xeon server in these experiments, LUCID can classify more than 55000
samples/sec on average, while 3LSTM barely reaches 1300 samples/sec on average
(i.e., more than 40 times slower). Indeed, LUCID’s limited number of hidden units and
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trainable parameters contribute to a much lower computational complexity compared
to 3LSTM.
As previously noted, there are a number of solutions in the literature that present
performance results for the ISCX2012 and CIC2017 datasets. Notably, these works do
not all specify whether the results presented are based on a validation dataset or a test
dataset. For LUCID, we reiterate that the results presented in this section are based on
a test set of completely unseen data.
Model ACC FPR PPV TPR F1
LUCID 0.9888 0.0179 0.9827 0.9952 0.9889
DeepDefense
3LSTM [53] 0.9841 N/A 0.9834 0.9847 0.9840
TR-IDS [82] 0.9809 0.0040 N/A 0.9593 N/A
E3ML [83] N/A N/A N/A 0.9474 N/A
Table 13: Performance comparison with State-Of-The-Art ap-
proaches using the ISCX2012 dataset for DDoS detection.
In Table 13, we compare the performance of LUCID against state-of-the-art works
validated on ISCX2012. Table 13 also includes the performance of 3LSTM as reported
in the DeepDefense paper [53]. With respect to our version of 3LSTM, the scores are
slightly lower, which we propose is due to the different pcap preprocessing mecha-
nisms used in the two implementations. This indicates a performance benefit when
using the LUCID preprocessing mechanism.
TR-IDS [82] is an IDS which adopts a text-CNN [58] to extract features from the
payload of the network traffic. These features, along with a combination of 25 packet
and flow-level attributes, are used for traffic classification by means of a Random
Forest algorithm. Accuracy and TPR scores of TR-IDS are above 0.99 for all the attack
profiles available in ISCX2012 except the DDoS attack, for which the performance
results are noticeably lower than LUCID.
E3ML [83] uses 20 entropy-based traffic features and three Machine Learning
(ML) classifiers (a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), a Multilayer Perceptron and
an Alternating Decision Tree) to classify the traffic as normal or DDoS. Despite the
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complex architecture, the TPR measured on ISCX2012 shows that E3ML is inclined to
false negatives.
For the CIC2017 dataset, we present the performance comparison with state-of-
the-art solutions in Table 14.
Model ACC FPR PPV TPR F1
LUCID 0.9967 0.0059 0.9939 0.9994 0.9966
DeepGFL [84] N/A N/A 0.7567 0.3024 0.4321
MLP [85] 0.8634 N/A 0.8847 0.8625 0.8735
1D-CNN [85] 0.9514 N/A 0.9814 0.9017 0.9399
LSTM [85] 0.9624 N/A 0.9844 0.8989 0.8959
1D-CNN +
LSTM [85] 0.9716 N/A 0.9741 0.9910 0.9825
Table 14: Performance comparison with State-Of-The-Art ap-
proaches using the CIC2017 dataset for DDoS detection.
DeepGFL [84] is a framework designed to extract high-order traffic features from
low-order features forming a hierarchical graph representation. To validate the pro-
posed framework, the authors used the graph representation of the features to train
two traffic classifiers, namely Decision Tree and Random Forest, and tested them on
CIC2017. Although the PPV scores on the several attack types are reasonably good
(between 0.88 and 1 on any type of traffic profile except DDoS), the results presented
in the paper reveal that the proposed approach is prone to false negatives, leading to
very low F1 scores.
The authors of [85] propose four different DL models for DDoS attack detection
in IoT networks. The models are built with combinations of LSTM, CNN and fully
connected layers. The input layer of all the models consists of 82 units, one for each
flow-level feature available in CIC2017, while the output layer returns the probability
of a given flow being part of a DDoS attack. The model 1D-CNN+LSTM produces
good classification scores, while the others seem to suffer from high false negatives
rates.
To the best of our knowledge, no DDoS attack detection solutions validated on the
CSECIC2018 dataset are available yet in the scientific literature.
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3.4.3 Discussion
From the results presented and analysed in the previous sections, we can conclude
that using packet-level attributes of network traffic is more effective, and results in
higher classification accuracy, than using flow-level features or statistic information
such as the entropy measure. This is not only proved by the evaluation results
obtained with LUCID and our implementation of DeepDefense (both based on packet-
level attributes), but also by the high classification accuracy of TR-IDS, which com-
bines flow-level features with packet attributes, including part of the payload.
In contrast, E3ML, DeepGFL and most of the solutions proposed in [85], which
all rely on flow-level features, seem to be more prone to false negatives, and hence
to classify DDoS attacks as normal activity. The only exception is the model 1D-
CNN+LSTM of [85], which produces a high TPR by combining CNN and RNN layers.
Furthermore, we highlight that LUCID has not been tuned to the individual datasets
but rather to the validation portion of a combined dataset, and still outperforms the
state-of-the-art on totally unseen test data.
3.5 Analysis
We now present interpretation and explanation of the internal operations of LUCID
by way of proving that the model is learning the correct domain information. We do
this by analysing the features used in the dataset and their activations in the model.
This approach is inspired by a similar study [86] to interpret CNNs in the rather
different domain of natural language processing. However, the kernel activation
analysis technique is transferable to our work. As each kernel has the same width
as the input matrix, it is possible to remove the classifier, push the DDoS flows
through the convolutional layer and capture the resulting activations per kernel. For
each flow, we calculate the total activations per feature, which in the spatial input
representation means per column, resulting in 11 values that map to the 11 features.
This is then repeated for all kernels, across all DDoS flows, with the final output
being the total column-wise activation of each feature. The intuition is that the higher
a feature’s activation when a positive sample i.e. a DDoS flow is seen, the more
importance the CNN attaches to that particular feature. Conversely, the lower the
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activation, the lower the importance of the feature, and since our model uses the
conventional rectified linear activation function, ReLU(x) = max{0, x}, this means
that any negative activations become zero and hence have no impact on the Sigmoid
classifier for detecting a DDoS attack.
Summing these activations over all kernels is possible since they are of the same
size and operate over the same spatial representations. We analyse DDoS flows from
the same UNB201X test set used in Sec. V-A. Table 15 presents the ranking of the 11
features based on the post-ReLU average column-wise feature activation sums, and
highlights two features that activate our CNN the most, across all of its kernels.
Feature
Total Kernel
Activation
Feature
Total Kernel
Activation
Highest Layer 0.69540 Time 0.11108
IP Flags 0.30337 TCP Win Size 0.09596
TCP Flags 0.19693 TCP Ack 0.00061
TCP Len 0.16874 UDP Len 0.00000
Protocols 0.14897 ICMP Type 0.00000
Pkt Len 0.14392
Table 15: Ranking of the total column-wise feature kernel activations for
the UNB201X dataset
Highest Layer. We assert that the CNN may be learning from the highest layer
at which each DDoS flow operates. Recall that highest layer links to the type of
DDoS attack e.g. network, transport, or application layer attack. We propose that this
information could be used to extend LUCID to predict the specific type of DDoS attack
taking place, and therefore, to contribute to selection of the appropriate protection
mechanism. We would achieve the prediction by extending the dataset labeling, which
we consider for future work.
IP Flags. In our design, this attribute is a 16-bit integer value which includes three
bits representing the flags Reserved Bit, Don’t Fragment and More Fragments, plus 13 bits
for the Fragment offset value, which is non-zero only if bit “Don’t Fragment” is unset.
Unlike the IP fragmented flood DDoS attacks, in which the IP flags are manipulated to
exploit the datagram fragmentation mechanisms, 99.99% of DDoS packets in the UNB
datasets present an IP flags value of 0x4000, with only the “Don’t Fragment” bit set
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to 1. A different distribution of IP flags is observed in the UNB benign traffic, with
the “Don’t Fragment” bit set to 1 in about 92% of the packets. Thus, the pattern of IP
flags is slightly different between attack and benign traffic, and we are confident that
LUCID is indeed learning their significance in DDoS classification, as evidenced by its
2nd place in our ranking.
Even given this activation analysis, there is no definitive list of features that exist
for detecting DDoS attacks with which we can directly compare our results. Analysing
the related work, we identify a wide range of both stateless and stateful features
highlighted for their influence in a given detection model, which is not unexpected as
the features of use vary depending on the attack traffic. This is highlighted by the 2014
study [87], which concludes that different classes of attack have different properties,
leading to the wide variance in features identified as salient for the attack detection.
The authors also observe that the learning of patterns specific to the attack scenario
would be more valuable than an effort to produce an attack-agnostic finite list of
features. We, therefore, conclude from our analysis that LUCID appears to be learning
the importance of relevant features for DDoS detection, which gives us confidence in
the prediction performance.
3.6 Use-case: DDoS Detection at the Edge
Edge computing is an emerging paradigm adopted in a variety of contexts (e.g., fog
computing [88], edge clouds [89]), with the aim of improving the performance of
applications with low-latency and high-bandwidth requirements. Edge computing
complements centralised data centres with a large number of distributed nodes that
provide computation services close to the sources of the data.
The proliferation of attacks leveraging unsecured IoT devices (e.g., the Mirai
botnet [17] and its variants) demonstrate the potential value in edge-based DDoS
attack detection. Indeed, with edge nodes close to the IoT infrastructure, they can
detect and block the DDoS traffic as soon as it leaves the compromised devices.
However, in contrast to cloud high-performance servers, edge nodes cannot exploit
sophisticated solutions against DDoS attacks, due to their limited computing and
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memory resources. Although recent research efforts have demonstrated that the miti-
gation of DDoS attacks is feasible even by means of commodity computers [90], [91],
edge computing-based DDoS detection is still at an early stage.
In this section, we demonstrate that our DDoS detection solution can be deployed
and effectively executed on resource-constrained devices, such as edge nodes or
IoT gateways, by running LUCID on an NVIDIA Jetson TX2 development board
[92] (Figure 17), equipped with a quad-core ARM Cortex-A57@2 GHz CPU, 8 GB
of RAM and a 256-core Pascal@1300 MHz Graphics Processing Unit (GPU). For the
experiments, we used Tensorflow 1.9.0 with GPU support enabled by cuDNN, a GPU-
accelerated library for deep neural networks [93].
Figure 17: The NVIDIA Jetson TX2 development board.
3.6.1 Detection
In the first experiment, we analyse the applicability of our approach to online edge
computing environments by estimating the prediction performance in terms of sam-
ples processed per second. As we are aware that edge nodes do not necessarily mount
a GPU device, we conduct the experiments with and without the GPU support on the
UNB201X test set and discuss the results.
We note that in an online system, our preprocessing tool presented in Section 3.2.1
can be integrated into the server/edge device. The tool would process the live traffic
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collected from the NICs of the server/edge device, collecting the packet attributes,
organising them into flows and, after a predefined time interval, T , pass the data
structure to the CNN for inference. We acknowledge that the speed of this process
will influence the overall system performance. However, as we have not focused on
optimising our preprocessing tool, rather on optimising detection, its evaluation is
left as future work. Instead, in these experiments, we load the UNB datasets from the
hard disk rather than processing live traffic.
With respect to this, one relevant parameter is the batch size, which configures
how many samples are processed by the CNN in parallel at each iteration. Such
a parameter influences the speed of the detection, as it determines the number of
iterations and, as a consequence, the number of memory reads required by the CNN
to process all the samples in the test set (or the samples collected in a time window,
in the case of online detection).
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Figure 18: Inference performance on the NVIDIA Jetson TX2 board.
Figure 18 shows the performance of LUCID on the development board in terms
of processed samples/second. As the shape of each sample is [n, f ] = [100, 11], i.e.
each sample can contain the features of up to 100 packets, we can estimate that the
maximum number of packets per second (pps) that the device can process without
the GPU and using a batch size of 1024 samples is approximately 1.9 Mpps. As an
example, the content of the UNB201X test set is 602,547 packets distributed over
22,416 samples, which represents a processing requirement of 500 Kpps without the
GPU, and 600 Kpps when the GPU is enabled. This illustrates the ability to deploy
LUCID on a resource-constrained platform.
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The second measurement regarding resource-constrained systems is the memory
requirement to store all the samples collected over a time window. The memory
occupancy per sample is 8,800 bytes, i.e. 100 ·11 = 1100 floating point values of 8 bytes
each. As per Figure 18, the CNN can process around 23K samples/second with the
help of the GPU and using a batch size of 1024. To cope with such a processing speed,
the device would require approximately 20 GB RAM for a t = 100 time window.
However, this value greatly exceeds the typical amount of memory available on edge
nodes, in general (e.g., 1 GB on Raspberry Pi 3 [94], 2 GB on the ODROID-XU board
[95]), and on our device, in particular. Indeed, the memory resources of nodes can
represent the real bottleneck in an edge computing scenario.
Therefore, assuming that our edge node is equipped with 1 GB RAM, the maxi-
mum number of samples that can be stored in RAM is approximately 100K (without
taking into account RAM used by the operating system and applications). We have
calculated that this memory size would be sufficient for an attack such as the HTTP-
based DDoS attack in the CSECIC2018 dataset, for which we measured approximately
30K samples on average over a 100 s time window. For more aggressive attacks,
however, a strategy to overcome the memory limitation would be to configure the
CNN model with lower values of t and n. For instance, setting the value of both
parameters to 10 can reduce the memory requirement by a factor of 100, with a low
cost in detection accuracy (F1 score 0.9928 on the UNB201X test set, compared to the
highest score obtained with t = n = 100, i.e. 0.9946).
The measurements based on our test datasets demonstrate that LUCID is usable on
a resource-constrained platform both with respect to processing and memory require-
ments. These results are promising for effective deployment of LUCID in a variety of
edge computing scenarios, including those where the nodes execute latency-sensitive
services. A major challenge in this regard is balancing between resource usage of
LUCID (including traffic collection and preprocessing) and detection accuracy, i.e.
ensuring the required level of protection against DDoS attacks without causing delays
to the services. A deep study of this trade-off is out of scope of this thesis and is
reserved for future work.
75
3.6.2 Training Time
In a real-world scenario, the CNN model will require re-training with new samples of
benign and malicious traffic to update all the weights and biases. In edge computing
environments, the traditional approach is to send large amounts of data from edge
nodes to remote facilities such as private or commercial data centres. However, this
can result in high end-to-end latency and bandwidth usage. In addition, it may raise
security concerns, as it requires trust in a third party entity (in the case of commercial
cloud services) regarding the preservation of data confidentiality and integrity.
A solution to this issue is to execute the re-training task locally on the edge nodes.
In this case, the main challenge is to control the total training time, as this time
determines how long the node remains exposed to new DDoS attacks before the
detection model can leverage the updated parameters.
To demonstrate the suitability of our model for this situation, we have mea-
sured the convergence training time of LUCID on the development board using
the UNB201X training and validation sets with and without the GPU support. We
have experimented by following the learning procedure described in Section 3.2.3,
thus with a training termination criterion based on the loss value measured on the
validation set. The results are presented in Table 16 along with the performance
obtained on the server used for the study in Section 3.3.4.
Setup Time/epoch(sec)
Convergence
time (sec)
LUCID Server 10.2 1880
LUCID Dev. board (GPU) 25.8 4500
LUCID Dev. board (CPU) 40.5 7450
3LSTM Dev. board (GPU) 1070 >90000
Table 16: Training convergence time.
As shown in Table 16, the CNN training time on the development board without
using the GPU is around 2 hours (184 epochs). This is approximately 4 times slower
than training on the server, but clearly outperforms the training time of our imple-
mentation of DeepDefense 3LSTM, which we measured at more than 1000 sec/epoch
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with the GPU (i.e., 40 times slower than LUCID under the same testing conditions).
In application scenarios where a faster convergence is required, the time can be
further reduced by either terminating the training process early after a pre-defined
number of epochs, or limiting the size of the training/validation sets. As adopting
one or both of such strategies can result in a lower detection accuracy, the challenge
in such scenarios is finding the trade-off between convergence time and detection
accuracy that meets the application requirements.
3.7 Related Work
DDoS detection and mitigation techniques have been explored by the network re-
search community since the first reported DDoS attack incident in 1999 [96]. In this
section, we review and discuss anomaly-based DDoS detection techniques categorised
by statistical approaches and machine learning approaches, with a specific focus on
deep learning techniques.
3.7.1 Statistical Approaches to DDoS Detection
Measuring statistical properties of network traffic attributes is a common approach to
DDoS detection, and generally involves monitoring the entropy variations of specific
packet header fields. By definition, the entropy is a measure of the diversity or the
randomness in a data set. Entropy-based DDoS detection approaches have been
proposed in the scientific literature since the early 2000s, based on the assumption
that during a volumetric DDoS attack, the randomness of traffic features is subject
to sudden variations. The rationale is that volumetric DDoS attacks are typically
characterised by a huge number of attackers (in the order of hundreds of thousands
[97]), often utilising compromised devices that send a high volume of traffic to one
or more end hosts (the victims). As a result, these attacks usually cause a drop in the
distribution of some of the traffic attributes, such as the destination IP address, or
an increase in the distribution of other attributes, such as the source IP address. The
identification of a DDoS attack is usually determined by means of thresholds on these
distribution indicators.
In one of the first published works using this approach, Feinstein et al. [98]
proposed a DDoS detection technique based on the computation of source IP address
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entropy and Chi-square distribution. The authors observed that the variation in
source IP address entropy and chi-square statistics due to fluctuations in legitimate
traffic was small, compared to the deviations caused by DDoS attacks. Similarly,
[99] combined entropy and volume traffic characteristics to detect volumetric DDoS
attacks, while the authors of [100] proposed an entropy-based scoring system based
on the destination IP address entropy and dynamic combinations of IP and TCP layer
attributes to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks.
A common drawback to these entropy-based techniques is the requirement to
select an appropriate detection threshold. Given the variation in traffic type and vol-
ume across different networks, it is a challenge to identify the appropriate detection
threshold that minimizes false positive and false negative rates in different attack
scenarios. One solution is to dynamically adjust the thresholds to auto-adapt to the
normal fluctuations of the network traffic, as proposed in [101], [102].
Importantly, monitoring the distribution of traffic attributes does not provide
sufficient information to distinguish between benign and malicious traffic. To address
this, some approaches apply a rudimentary threshold on the packet rate [103] or
traceback techniques [104], [105].
An alternative statistical approach is adopted in [106], where Ahmed et al. use
packet attributes and traffic flow-level statistics to distinguish between benign and
DDoS traffic. However, this solution may not be suitable for online systems, since
some of the flow-level statistics used for the detection e.g. total bytes, number of
packets from source to destination and from destination to source, and flow duration,
cannot be computed when the traffic features are collected within observation time
windows. Approaches based on flow-level statistics have also been proposed in [107],
[84], [82], [108], [85], [109], among many others. In particular, [82], [108], [85], [109]
use flow-level statistics to feed CNNs and other DL models, as discussed in Sec. 3.7.3.
To overcome the limitations of statistical approaches to DDoS detection, machine
learning techniques have been explored.
3.7.2 Machine Learning for DDoS Detection
As identified by Sommer and Paxson in [110], there has been extensive research
on the application of machine learning to network anomaly detection. The 2016
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Buczak and Guven survey [111] cites the use of Support Vector Machine (SVM),
k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN), Random Forest, Naı¨ve Bayes etc. achieving success
for cyber security intrusion detection. However, due to the challenges particular to
network intrusion detection, such as high cost of errors, variability in traffic etc.,
adoption of these solutions in the “real-world” has been limited. Over recent years,
there has been a gradual increase in availability of realistic network traffic data sets
and an increased engagement between data scientists and network researchers to
improve model explainability such that more practical ML solutions for network
attack detection can be developed. Some of the first application of machine learning
techniques specific to DDoS detection has been for traffic classification. Specifically, to
distinguish between benign and malicious traffic, techniques such as extra-trees and
multi-layer perceptrons have been applied [112], [113].
In consideration of the realistic operation of DDoS attacks from virtual machines,
He et al. [114] evaluate nine ML algorithms to identify their capability to detect the
DDoS from the source side in the cloud. The results are promising with high accuracy
(99.7%) and low false positives (< 0.07%) for the best performing algorithm; SVM
linear kernel. Although there is no information provided regarding the detection time
or the datasets used for the evaluation, the results illustrate the variability in accuracy
and performance across the range of ML models. This is reflected across the literature
(e.g., [115], [116]) with the algorithm performance highly dependent on the selected
features (and datasets) evaluated. This has motivated the consideration of deep learn-
ing for DDoS detection, which reduces the emphasis on feature engineering.
3.7.3 Deep Learning for DDoS Detection
There is a small body of work investigating the application of DL to DDoS detec-
tion. For example, in [83], the authors address the problem of threshold setting in
entropy-based techniques by combining entropy features with DL-based classifiers.
The evaluation demonstrates improved performance over the threshold-based ap-
proach with higher precision and recall. In [117], a RNN-IDS is compared with a
series of previously presented ML techniques (e.g., J48, Artificial Neural Network
(ANN), Random Forest, and SVM) applied to the NSL-KDD [118] dataset. The RNN
technique demonstrates a higher accuracy and detection rate.
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Some CNN-based works [82], [108], [85], [109], as identified in Sec. 3.7.1, use flow-
level statistics (total bytes, flow duration, total number of flags, etc.) as input to the
proposed DL-based architectures. In addition, [82] and [108] combine the statistical
features with packet payloads to train the proposed IDSs.
In [68], Kehe Wu et al. present an IDS based on CNN for multi-class traffic
classification. The proposed neural network model has been validated with flow-level
features from the NSL-KDD dataset encoded into 11x11 arrays. Evaluation results
show that the proposed model performs well compared to complex models with
20 times more trainable parameters. A similar approach is taken by the authors of
[69], where the CNN-based IDS is validated over datasets NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB-
15 [119]. In [120], the authors study the application of CNNs to IDS by comparing
a series of architectures (shallow, moderate, and deep, to reflect the number of con-
volution and pooling layers) across 3 traffic datasets; NSL-KDD, Kyoto Honeypot
[121], and MAWILab [122]. In the results presented, the shallow CNN model with
a single convolution layer and single max. pooling layer performed best. However,
there is significant variance in the detection accuracy results across the datasets, which
indicates instability in the model.
More specific to our DDoS problem, Ghanbari et al. propose a feature extraction
algorithm based on the discrete wavelet transform and on the variance fractal dimension
trajectory to maximize the sensitivity of the CNN in detecting DDoS attacks [54]. The
evaluation results show that the proposed approach recognises DDoS attacks with
87.35% accuracy on the CAIDA DDoS attack dataset [123]. Although the authors
state that their method allows real-time detection of DDoS attacks in a range of
environments, no performance measurements are reported to support this claim.
DeepDefense [53] combines CNNs and RNNs to translate original traffic traces
into arrays that contain packet features collected within sliding time windows. The
results presented demonstrate high accuracy in DDoS attack detection within the
selected ISCX2012 dataset [73]. However, it is not clear if these results were obtained
on unseen test data, or are results from the training phase. Furthermore, the number of
trainable parameters in the model is extremely large indicating a long and resource-
intensive training phase. This would significantly challenge implementation in an
online system with constrained resources, as discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.6.
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Although deep learning offers the potential for an effective DDoS detection method,
as described, existing approaches are limited by their suitability for online implemen-
tation in resource-constrained environments, as shown in Section 3.6.
81
4 High-Performance Server-based DDoS
Mitigation
I n recent years, the complexity of the network data plane and its requirements interms of agility has increased significantly, with many network functions now
implemented in software and executed directly in data centre servers. To avoid bot-
tlenecks and to keep up with the ever increasing network speeds, recent approaches
propose to move the software packet processing to kernel space using technologies
such as the extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) and the eXpress Data Path (XDP),
or to offload (part of) it to specialised hardware, the so called Smart Network Interface
Cards (SmartNICs).
In this chapter, we analyse the aforementioned technologies and we study how
to exploit them to build an efficient DDoS attack mitigation pipeline. In particular,
we enhance the DDoS mitigation capabilities of edge servers by offloading a portion
of DDoS mitigation rules to the SmartNIC, achieving a balanced combination of the
eBPF/XDP flexibility in operating traffic sampling and aggregation in the kernel,
with the performance of hardware-based filtering. We demonstrate the benefits of
the proposed processing pipeline over iptables, a commonly used technology for
packet filtering in Linux-based hosts. We also evaluate the performance of different
combinations of host and SmartNIC-based mitigation, showing that offloading part
of the DDoS network function to the SmartNIC can indeed improve the packet
processing, but only if combined with additional processing in the host kernel space.
This study has been carried out in collaboration with Politecnico di Torino’s
Department of Computer and Control Engineering. Moreover, the results have been
published in the IEEE Access journal [90].
This rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 provides the motivation
behind this study. Section 4.2 presents a high-level overview of eBPF, XDP and
SmartNIC technologies. Section 4.3 analyses the different approaches that can be used
to build an efficient host-based DDoS mitigation solution. Section 4.4 presents the
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design of an architecture that uses the above mentioned technologies to mitigate
DDoS attacks. Finally, Section 4.5 provides the necessary evidence to justify the
findings, while Section 4.6 briefly discusses the related work.
4.1 Motivation
The ever-growing network capacity installed in data centre and enterprise networks
requires a highly flexible low-latency packet processing, which is difficult to achieve
with the current mechanisms adopted in software-based network functions. Common
solutions rely on kernel bypass approaches, such as DPDK [3] and Netmap [4],
which map the network hardware buffers directly to user space memory, hence
bypassing the operating system. Although these technologies bring an unquestionable
performance improvement, they also have two major limitations. First, they take over
one (or more) CPU cores, thus permanently stealing precious CPU cycles to other
tasks (e.g., other VNFs deployed on the server). Second, they require the installation
of additional kernel modules or update of the network card driver, operations that
are not always possible in production networks.
Recent technologies such as eBPF [124], [125] and XDP [91] offer excellent process-
ing capabilities without requiring the permanent allocation of dedicated resources
in the host. Furthermore, eBPF/XDP are included in vanilla Linux kernels, hence
avoiding the need to install custom kernel modules or additional device drivers.
4.2 Background
The extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) is an enhanced version of the BPF
virtual machine [126], originally proposed as a kernel packet filtering mechanism
and used to implement network utilities such as tcpdump. Compared to the original
version, eBPF enables the execution of custom bytecode (eBPF programs) at various
points of the Linux kernel in a safe manner. eBPF programs can be safely injected in
various kernel subsystems for tracing (e.g., kprobes, tracepoints, etc.) and networking
purposes (through the XDP and Traffic Control (TC) hooks). eBPF programs share
information (e.g., network traffic statistics) with user space applications through data
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structures called eBPF maps. Conversely, user space applications can use such maps
to set configuration parameters for the eBPF programs at run time.
The eXpress Data Path (XDP) is an execution environment residing at the lowest
level of the TCP/IP stack in the Linux kernel. In the XDP environment, eBPF programs
can be executed directly upon the receipt of a packet and immediately after the driver
RX queues. In the case of volumetric DDoS attacks, the combination of XDP and
eBPF can be exploited to efficiently process the network traffic and to drop malicious
packets before they reach the system TCP/IP stack and the user space applications,
with minimal consumption of the host CPU resources.
SmartNICs are intelligent network adapters that can be used to boost the per-
formance of servers by offloading (part of) the network processing workload from
the host CPU to the SmartNIC itself [127]. While a traditional Network Interface
Controller (NIC) implements a pre-defined set of basic functions (e.g., transmit/re-
ceive, segmentation, checksum computation), a SmartNIC is equipped with a fully-
programmable system-on-chip (SoC) multi-core processor that is capable of running a
fully-fledged operating system, offering more flexibility and hence potentially taking
care of any arbitrary network processing tasks. SmartNICs are usually equipped with
a set of specialised hardware functionalities that can be used to accelerate a specific
class of functions (e.g., OpenvSwitch data-plane) or to perform generic packet and
flow-filtering at line-rate. Compared to a server, a SmartNIC has limited computing
and memory capabilities, confining its application space to lightweight tasks.
4.3 DDoS Mitigation: Approaches
Efficient packet dropping is a fundamental part of a DDoS attack mitigation solution.
In a typical DDoS mitigation pipeline, a set of mitigation rules are deployed in the
server’s data plane to filter the malicious traffic. The strategy used to block the mali-
cious sources may be determined by several factors such as the characteristics of the
server (e.g., availability of a SmartNIC, its hardware capabilities), the characteristics
of the malicious traffic (e.g., number of attackers) or the type and complexity of the
rules that are used to classify the illegitimate traffic.
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4.3.1 Host-based Mitigation
All the host-based DDoS mitigation techniques and tools used today fall into two
macro-categories, depending on whether packets are processed at kernel or user space
level.
Focusing on Linux-based systems, kernel-space approaches are based either on
iptables and its derivatives, such as nftables, or on XDP programs. iptables is a popular
tool for monitoring, manipulating and filtering the network traffic with the support
of the kernel’s netfilter subsystem. As demonstrated in Section 4.5, the deep level in
the networking stack where the packet processing is executed, and the suboptimal
matching algorithm used to monitor the traffic, make iptables and netfilter practically
unusable for mitigating today’s volumetric DDoS attacks. On the other hand, XDP
resides at the lowest levels of the network stack and, compared to netfilter, it intercepts
the network traffic earlier, right after the NIC driver, and exploits a more efficient
matching algorithm. Although the attention on the XDP technology has been growing
in recent years, its adoption in DDoS mitigation solutions is still in its infancy [128],
[129].
User space approaches rely on specialised I/O frameworks (Netmap [4], DPDK [3],
PF RING ZC [130], among others) to obtain direct access to the NIC device memory,
by-passing the kernel network system and its overheads. Although these technolo-
gies bring an unquestionable performance improvement, they also have two major
limitations. First, these frameworks require the exclusive access to the NIC, so that
all packets received on the interface are processed by the user space monitoring
application. In the case of a user space application for DDoS mitigation, the benign
packets must be injected back to the kernel’s network stack, requiring further CPU
and memory resources for handling the additional packet copies generated by this
process.1. Furthermore, such frameworks require a fixed allocation of one (or more)
CPU cores, irrespective of the amount of incoming traffic, hence stealing computing
resources from other processes running on the host.
1. It is worth mentioning that Netmap has a better kernel integration compared to DPDK, as Netmap implements
a zero-copy approach for injecting the packets back into the kernel. However, it is subjected to a higher CPU
consumption compared to XDP.
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4.3.2 SmartNIC-based Mitigation
A strategy to save CPU resources on the host is to offload the DDoS mitigation
task to a SmartNIC. With this approach, the malicious packets are dropped by the
SmartNIC, whereas only the surviving benign traffic continues its path towards the
final destination, such as the processes executed on the host or the host’s routing
system, before being sent to the next hop. The availability of a SmartNIC enables
three different DDoS mitigation options: (i) hardware packet filtering: line-rate traffic
processing by means of hardware tables available on the SmartNIC (if any), (ii)
software packet filtering: mitigation program executed on the SmartNIC CPU when
no hardware filtering is possible, and (iii) a combination of (i) and (ii) if the hardware
tables do not have the capacity to accommodate the complete list of filtering rules.
SmartNICs can execute programs that are statically or dynamically installed from
the host, or directly compiled inside the card [131]. As not all of the above options
are supported by all SmartNICs, the implementation of a generic offloading strategy
suitable for cards from multiple manufacturers is usually a challenging task.
4.3.3 Hybrid (SmartNIC + XDP Host)
As noted in the previous section, executing the complete mitigation task on a SmartNIC
avoids any overhead for the host, hence saving CPU cycles for other applications.
However, because of the limited capacity of the SmartNIC’s hardware tables, usu-
ally in the order of 1K-2K filtering rules, and the limited processing power of the
SmartNIC’s CPU, this approach might not be always the optimal solution. Indeed, in
the case of DDoS attacks, a large number of packets (both DDoS and benign) would
be queued in the buffers and then discarded because they are not handled in the
allocated time.
One solution is to split the mitigation pipeline between the SmartNIC and the host.
With this “hybrid” approach, the filtering rules that do not fit into the SmartNIC’s
hardware tables are handled in the host, hence leveraging the faster CPU, compared
to the SmartNIC, to speed-up the mitigation process. Of course, this approach leads
to better performance with respect to a pure SmartNIC-based mitigation solution, but
it is more expensive in terms of CPU resources required on the host. A comparison
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of these two approaches in terms of dropping rate and CPU usage is presented in
Section 4.5.
4.4 Architecture and Implementation
This section presents the architecture we have designed to evaluate the mitigation
approaches discussed in the previous section. The architecture features a data plane
composed of a set of XDP programs that may run either on the SmartNIC, on the
host’s kernel, or both, which are in charge of filtering malicious packets and extracting
the relevant information from the received traffic. Extracted features are used by the
control plane DDoS detection algorithm to identify malicious sources and to configure
the blacklisted IP addresses in the data plane. The overall architecture is depicted in
Figure 19; the following sections will present the above components in greater detail.
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Figure 19: High-level architecture of the system.
4.4.1 Mitigation
The first program encountered in the pipeline is the Filtering module, which matches
the incoming packets against the content of a blacklist and drops them if the result
is positive; surviving packets are redirected to the next program in the pipeline, the
Feature Extraction.
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At system start-up, the system instantiates the Filtering XDP program in the host to
obtain the necessary traffic information and decide the best mitigation strategy. If the
user space DDoS Mitigation module recognizes the availability of the hardware offload
functionality in the SmartNIC, it starts adding the filtering rules into the hardware
tables, causing malicious packets to be immediately dropped in hardware. However,
since those tables often have a limited size (typically ∼1-2K entries), the strategy is
to place the filtering rules of the k most active malicious talkers in the SmartNIC’s
hardware tables, where k is the size of those tables. The remaining rules are stored in
eBPF hash maps (data structures of type BPF_MAP_ TYPE_HASH [132]) either on the
SmartNIC or on the host, depending on the adopted mitigation approach.
4.4.2 Feature Extraction
The Feature Extraction XDP program monitors the incoming traffic and collects rel-
evant packet attributes required by the user space detection algorithm (e.g., IP ad-
dresses, protocols, flags, etc.). Being placed right after the mitigation module, it
receives all the (presumed) benign traffic that has not been previously dropped. The
benign traffic is then passed to the network stack of the host, which forwards it to
the target user space applications or to the next hop in the path towards the final
destination.
Packet attributes are stored in eBPF hash maps, one for each CPU core, which are
periodically read by the user space DDoS attack detection application. Since multiple
instances of the same XDP program are executed in parallel on different CPU cores,
each one processing a different packet, the use of dedicated per-core maps guarantees
a very fast access to the data, avoiding costly (in terms of CPU cycles) synchronisation
operations between the cores. As a result, each instance of the feature extraction works
independently, storing the packet attributes in its own private eBPF hash map.
4.4.3 Detection
The identification of a DDoS attack is performed by the user space DDoS Attack Detec-
tion module, which operates on the traffic statistics collected by the Feature Extraction
XDP program, and exploits the retrieved information to identify the malicious traffic
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sources. Appropriate filtering rules are then inserted in the Blacklist map used by the
Filtering XDP program to drop the traffic. We remind that the challenges related to
the detection of DDoS attacks have been covered in Chapter 3, which also provides a
detailed overview of recent solutions in Section 3.7.
Of course, the specific detection algorithm determines the type of traffic informa-
tion exported by the Feature Extraction program. However, the modular design of our
architecture and the high level of programmability of XDP enable the provisioning of
different feature extraction schemes, without impacting on the rest of the architecture.
4.4.4 Rate Monitor
The Blacklist is also used to keep track of the number of packets dropped for each
malicious source stored in it. Such statistics, called Counters in Figure 19, are used by
the user space program Rate Monitor to remove from the Blacklist the sources that are
no longer part of a DDoS attack, or that were erroneously classified as malicious by
the Detection algorithm. The outcome of this process is twofold: first, the restoration of
traffic forwarding from legitimate sources and second, a reduced Blacklist size, hence
shorter query execution time for the Filtering XDP program.
The process starts from the global list of blacklisted addresses, sorted according
to their traffic volume. The Rate Monitor examines the entries that are at the bottom
of the list (i.e., the sources sending less traffic), comparing them with a threshold
value. If the current transmission rate of the source under consideration is below the
threshold, defined as the highest rate of packets with the same source observed under
normal network activity, it is removed from the Blacklist. In the case that a malicious
source is removed by mistake, the detection algorithm can re-add it to the Blacklist
during the next iteration.
4.5 Evaluation
This section provides evidence of the benefits of using SmartNICs and eBPF/XDP in
the DDoS attacks mitigation. For this purpose, the mitigation approaches discussed
in Section 4.3 are compared against iptables, used as a baseline for the evaluation.
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4.5.1 Experimental Setup
The testbed comprises two server-class computers, both equipped with a quad-core
Intel Xeon E3-1245@3.50GHz, 8MB of L3 cache, 32GB DDR4-2400 RAM memory, and
both running Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS and the Linux kernel version 4.15. The two servers
are directly connected to each other via 25Gbps SmartNICs interfaces. One server is
used to generate volumetric DDoS attacks against the other server, which runs the
DDoS mitigation pipeline. The attacks are simulated using Pktgen-DPDK v3.6.4 [133],
a high-performance testing tool included in the Linux kernel, capable of generating
line-rate network traffic. In all the experiments presented below, we use Pktgen-DPDK
to simulate volumetric DDoS attacks in the form of streams of 64-byte UDP packets.
4.5.2 Mitigation Performance
In the first test, we compare the DDoS mitigation approaches in terms of dropping rate
(Mpps, millions of packets per second) and CPU consumption (%). For this purpose,
we generate line-rate traffic at 25Gbps (corresponding approximately to 37.2Mpps),
with an increasing number of source IPs to simulate botnets of different sizes.
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Figure 20: Dropping rate with an increasing number of attackers.
iptables-based mitigation: As briefly introduced in Section 4.3, iptables is a user
space command line tool for configuring the Linux kernel’s netfilter packet filtering
framework. To maximize the performance of iptables, in this test we use the netfilter
PREROUTING chain, which can access (and drop) the traffic as soon as it enters the
network stack, before the kernel’s routing operations.
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Figure 21: CPU usage of the different mitigation approaches under a simu-
lated DDoS attack.
Figure 20 shows that the dropping rate of iptables is limited, around 2.5-4.5Mpps,
even with a relatively small number of attack sources. This is mainly due to the
matching algorithm used by iptables, whose performance degrades linearly with the
number of filtering rules inserted in the blacklist, leading to a throughput almost
equal to zero with more than 4K rules.
The CPU consumption (Figure 21) confirms this limitation: using iptables to mit-
igate large DDoS attacks saturates the CPU, leaving almost no computing resources
for the other processes running on the host.
XDP-based mitigation: This test runs the entire mitigation pipeline on the host
without involving the SmartNIC, which simply forwards the packets to the XDP
program executed in the host.
The dropping efficiency of XDP is much higher than iptables, being able to pro-
cess from ∼26Mpps in the presence of 1K attackers or less, to ∼10Mpps with 128K
attackers (XDP Host curve in Figure 20).
In XDP, the blacklist is implemented using an eBPF hash map (BPF_MAP_TYPE_
HASH), whose lookup algorithm is much faster than that of iptables. In fact, although
both approaches saturate the host’s CPU (Figure 21), XDP can handle massive DDoS
attacks with more than 4K different sources, whereas iptables stops working.
SmartNIC-based mitigation: In this experiment, the mitigation pipeline is exe-
cuted entirely on the SmartNIC. We first perform a test where the attack is mitigated
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only through an XDP filtering program running on the SmartNIC, without any help
from the hardware filter available on the network card. Compared to the host-based
mitigation, the slower CPU of the NIC leads to a performance degradation in the
dropping rate (Figure 20 (XDP SmartNIC curve). On the other hand, no host comput-
ing resources are consumed (Figure 21), as the whole mitigation is executed on the
SmartNIC.
A second test exploits a mixture of hardware and XDP-based software filtering
on the card. As shown in Figures 20 and 21, up to 512K sources, the dropping
rate corresponds to the input traffic rate, where 512K is the maximum number of
entries (IP addresses) that fit in the SmartNIC’s hardware tables. With larger attacks,
part of the blacklist is maintained outside the hardware tables by the XDP program
running in the SmartNIC, hence leading to a decrease in the overall performance of
the mitigation system.
Hybrid approach (SmartNIC Hardware Tables + XDP Host): Here the offloading
algorithm splits the mitigation pipeline between the SmartNIC’s hardware tables and
the XDP filtering program running in the host.
Similar to the previous experiment, we can notice a line rate packet dropping up
to 512K sources (HW + XDP Host in Figure 20). Moreover, the performance of the
host CPU leads to a higher dropping rate for large attacks, compared to the approach
confined to the SmartNIC discussed above. The price to pay is a consumption of host
computing resources, which increases with the number of attackers’ IPs exceeding the
space available in the hardware tables (Figure 21).
Final remarks: The benefits of offloading the packet filtering tasks to a SmartNIC
are higher when most of the traffic can be handled in hardware, hence maximising the
overall performance of the DDoS mitigation system and saving precious computing
resources on the host.
It is worth noticing that the case where a host has to cope with a limited number of
malicious sources is rather common, as the incoming traffic in data centres is usually
balanced across multiple servers (backends), each one being asked to handle only a
portion of the connections and, as a consequence, of the attackers.
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4.5.3 Impact on the Legitimate Traffic
As illustrated in Section 4.5.2, mitigating a volumetric DDoS attack has a cost in
terms of CPU usage. Of course, the reduced computing resources can have a negative
effect on the other processes running on the victim machine. In this experiment,
we evaluate the impact of the DDoS mitigation approaches under consideration on
the web services provided by the server acting as a DDoS victim. For this test, we
generate 1M HTTP requests using 200 concurrent clients towards the nginx web
server running on the target server. We measure the number of successful HTTP
requests per second completed within 5 seconds, as a function of the DDoS traffic
rate.
It is worth recalling that the SmartNIC, similar to traditional NICs, discards
incoming packets when its buffer is full. In our case, we can observe such a behaviour
when the DDoS mitigation system is not able to process packets at the rate they arrive
at the interface. Of course, the packet rate and the number of attack sources influence
the ability of the system to process the traffic in time without forcing the SmartNIC
to discard packets. In this experiment, we vary the DDoS packet rate between 1Mpps
and line rate (37.2Mpps), whereas the number of attackers is kept constant at 1K in a
first test, and then at 64K in a second test.
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Figure 22: Number of successfully completed HTTP requests/s under different DDoS traffic rates.
With 1K attackers, the hardware tables process half of the malicious traffic, with
noticeable benefits at every DDoS packet rate (HW + XDP Host and HW + XDP Smart-
NIC in Figure 22(a)) compared to pure software-based approaches (XDP Host and
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XDP SmartNIC). Moreover, at low DDoS packet rates we can observe a higher number
of successful HTTP connections achieved when running XDP on the SmartNIC with
respect to that obtained with XDP executed on the host machine. Indeed, despite
a higher computing capacity, the CPU of the server is also busy serving the HTTP
requests, whereas the CPU of the SmartNIC is completely devoted to XDP. This
behaviour disappears at DDoS packet rates higher than v17Mpps, as the impact on
the host CPU of the HTTP requests becomes negligible with respect to the load for
processing the DDoS packets.
Figure 22(b) reports the results obtained with 64K attackers. In this case, the
performance gain obtained with the hardware tables is less significant, as only one
packet in every 128 is processed in hardware, whereas the large majority are handled
in software either on the SmartNIC or on the host. More importantly, the long lookup
tables require a high search time, leading to high amounts of discarded packets even
at low DDoS packet rates.
Finally, the iptables-based mitigation is infeasible at any rate of DDoS traffic due to
the slow linear search mechanism, causing the failure of the large majority of HTTP
requests.
4.6 Related Work
The advantages of using XDP to filter packets at high rates have been largely dis-
cussed and demonstrated [134], [135]; several companies (e.g., Facebook, Cloudflare)
have integrated XDP in their data centre networks to protect end hosts from un-
wanted traffic, given the enormous benefits from both filtering performance and low
resource consumption. In particular, in [128] Cloudflare presented a DDoS mitigation
architecture that was initially based on kernel bypass, to overcome the performance
limitations of iptables, and classical BPF to filter packets in user space. However,
they subsequently shifted to an XDP-based architecture called L4Drop [136] that
performs packet sampling and dropping within an XDP program itself. Our approach
is slightly different; we use an XDP program to extract the relevant packet headers
from all the received traffic, instead of sending the entire samples to the user space
detection application and we consider simpler filtering rules, which are needed to
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deal with the SmartNIC hardware limitations. Finally, we consider in our architecture
the use of SmartNICs to improve the packet processing, which introduces additional
complexity (e.g., select rules to offload), which is not needed in a host-based solution.
In this direction, [137] analysed and proposed a hybrid architecture that use SmartNIC
to improve VNFs processing capabilities. However, to the best of our knowledge,
this work is the first that analyses and proposes a complete hardware/software
architecture for the DDoS mitigation use case.
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5 Conclusions
I n this thesis, we have presented models, algorithms and architectures for the pro-visioning of security services in “softwarised” networks, where the network func-
tions can be implemented as host-based software components running inside virtual
machines or containers. We have provided a solution for dynamically provisioning
security services in a softwarised TSP network, where the objective is the minimi-
sation of the consumed computing and network resources. The proposed approach,
called PESS, takes into account security and QoS requirements of user applications
and ensures that computing and network resources are accurately utilised. We have
discussed the rationale behind our design decisions and presented an ILP formulation
and a heuristic algorithm that solve the placement problem. The evaluation results
demonstrate the benefits of PESS for both users and telecom operators, with savings in
resource utilisation and in end-to-end latency. We have also shown that the heuristic
implementation of the proposed application-aware approach produces near-optimal
solutions and scales well in large and dense networks, indicating the potential of PESS
in real-world scenarios. Although PESS has been designed for TSP networks, we are
confident that the proposed methods are generic enough to cover different application
scenarios. One example in this regard is the SD-Branch-enabled enterprise [138], in
which branch connectivity, networking and security functions are provided through
a centrally managed software-based platform. Given the raising availability on the
market of SD-Branch solutions [139], [140], [141], we believe that investigating the
applicability of PESS to softwarised enterprise networks is a promising direction for
future work in this area.
We have also proposed host-based software solutions for the detection and mitiga-
tion of DDoS attacks with efficient usage of CPU resources. With respect to the attack
detection, we have presented a DL-based architecture called LUCID. Our design has
targeted a practical, lightweight implementation with low processing overhead and
attack detection time. The benefit of the DL model is to remove threshold configura-
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tion as required by statistical detection approaches, and reduce feature engineering
and the reliance on human experts required by alternative ML techniques. This
enables practical deployment. In contrast to existing solutions, our unique traffic pre-
processing mechanism acknowledges how traffic flows across network devices and is
designed to present network traffic to the DL model for online DDoS attack detection.
Our evaluation results demonstrate that LUCID matches the existing state-of-the-art
performance. However, distinct from existing work, we have demonstrated consis-
tent detection results across a range of datasets, demonstrating the stability of our
solution. Furthermore, our evaluation on a resource-constrained device demonstrates
the suitability of our model for deployment in resource-constrained environments.
Specifically, we have achieved a 40x improvement in processing time over similar
state-of-the-art solutions. We have also presented an activation analysis to explain
how LUCID learns to detect DDoS traffic, which is lacking in existing works.
Linked to the activation analysis, the robustness to Adversarial Machine Learning
(AML) attacks is a key consideration for the deployment of LUCID. As detailed in
[142], the two main attacks on IDSs are during training via a poisoning attack (i.e.
corruption of the training data), or in testing, when an evasion attack attempts to
cause incorrect classification by making small perturbations to observed features. Our
activation analysis is a first step in the investigation of LUCID behaviour in adversarial
cases with the feature ranking in Table 15 highlighting the features for perturbation
for evasion attacks. Of course, the adversary model (goal, knowledge, and capability)
dictates the potential for a successful attack. For example, the attacker would require
full knowledge of the CNN and kernel activations, and have the ability to forge traffic
within the network. The construction of defences robust to adversarial attacks is an
open problem [143] and an aspect which we will further explore for LUCID.
With respect to the DDoS attack response, we have conducted an analysis of vari-
ous approaches for building an efficient and cost-effective DDoS mitigation pipeline.
We have compared the performance of the different mitigation alternatives based on
combinations of hardware technologies (a Smart Network Interface Card (SmartNIC))
and recent software technologies (the extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) and
the eXpress Data Path (XDP)). According to our experiments, the best approach is
a combination of hardware filtering on the SmartNIC and software filtering with
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eBPF/XDP on the host, which presents the most efficient results in terms of drop-
ping rate and CPU usage. However, our findings suggest that current SmartNICs
can help mitigating the network load on congested servers, but may not represent
a turn-key solution. For instance, an effective SmartNIC-based solution for DDoS
attacks may require the presence of a DDoS-aware load balancer that distributes
incoming datacentre traffic in a way to reduce the amount of attackers landing on
each server, whose number should be compatible with the size of the hardware tables
of the SmartNIC. Otherwise, the solution may require the software running on the
SmartNICs to cooperate with other components running on the host, reducing the
effectiveness of the solution in terms of saved resources in the servers.
Beyond the aspects studied in this thesis, there is a range of open issues for
practical and effective implementation of software-based security network functions.
As highlighted in [144], these include VSNF secured boot, VSNF secure crash, VSNF
performance isolation, private keys protection and distribution, back-doors on VNF
management/test/debug interfaces. One of the most challenging is the VSNF per-
formance isolation, which is linked to the characterisation of the CPU usage of the
VSNFs under normal and abnormal conditions. In this direction, our current research
focuses on implementing a fully-fledged DDoS defence system built around LUCID
and eBPF/XDP, with predictable and tunable CPU consumption even under volu-
metric DDoS attacks. The plan is to design a VSNF that works in edge computing
environments without compromising the operations of other processes running on
the same edge node. The problem is complex, as the CPU requirements of LUCID
depend on the number of flows collected in a given time interval, while those of
eBPF/XDP depend on the number of entries in the blacklist.
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